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Abstract
We discuss a series of simple models for the microstructure of a double auction market
without intermediaries. We specialize to those markets, such interdealer broker markets,
which are dominated by professional traders, who trade mainly through limit orders, watch
markets closely, and move their limit order prices frequently. We model these markets
as a set of buyers and a set of sellers, whose numbers vary in time, and who diffuse in
price space and interact through an annihilation interaction. We seek to compute the
purely statistical effects of the presence of large numbers of traders, as scaling laws on
various measures of liquidity, and to this end we allow our model very few parameters.
∗deliezer@genre.com
†i.kogan1@physics.ox.ac.uk
We find that the bid-offer spread scales as
√
1/Deal Rate. In addition we investigate the
scaling of other intuitive relationships, such as the relation between fluctuations of the
best bid/offer and the density of buyers/sellers. We then study this model and its scaling
laws under the influence of random disturbances to trader drift, trader volatility, and
entrance rate. We also study possible extensions to the model, such as the addition of
market order traders, and an interaction that models momentum-type trading. Finally,
we discuss how detailed simulations may be carried out to study scaling in all of these
settings, and how the models may be tested in actual markets.
2
1. Introduction.
Market microstructure has made considerable progress in the past few years in un-
derstanding price formation in formally organized markets. Most particularly this has
been done by considering the dealer’s optimization problem. Starting with the work of
Garman [3], and continuing with Stoll [4], Ho and Stoll [5], O’Hara and Oldfield [6], and
Amihud and Mendelson [7], the various elements of this problem and its consequences
have gradually been elucidated [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. For a more complete bibliography, see [1, 2].
A separate but parallel line of research, also beginning with Garman, and extending
through Cohen-Maier-Schwartz-Whitcomb [8, 11], has considered the structure of double
auction markets, markets without intermediaries. Such markets are simpler to treat than
the dealer problem. This is because the large number of traders are considered to act inde-
pendently of one another and their aggregate behavior may therefore be treated using well
developed stochastic methods, as a purely statistical system. Thus it is considered that
the great press of numbers, not any complex social interaction, or difficult optimization
problem, is the principle determinant of large scale market behavior in a double auction
market. In this regard Garman [3] first studied trade price distributions over time in a
double auction market. In [8] Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb considered the
time to trade in such a market, under the assumption of finite-sized trader movements.
In [11], they studied the effect of “thinness” on market returns, where thinness, the value
of shares outstanding, was used as a proxy for liquidity.
More recently, price evolution in double auction markets was studied by Bak, Paczuski
and Shubik (BPS) [27], who introduced a model in the same vein as the Garman model,
with additional features that effectively mapped double auction market dynamics onto
a type of model from chemistry, known as diffusion-controlled annihilation. Like Gar-
man, they used this to study trade price distributions over time, obtaining a model that
goes beyond the standard Brownian motion model, to recover the empirically observed
“fat tail” distributions, and the associated Hurst exponent. The diffusion-controlled an-
nihilation model relevant to markets is a model in one dimensional space, with initially
segregated reactants, and forms an interface, a “reaction front”. This front was first stud-
ied by Ga´lfi and Ra´cz[28], and then later was developed in a series of papers by Cardy
and coworkers[29], and studied numerically by several groups [30]. Early contributors to
the theory of diffusion-controlled annihilation include Doi [31], and Peliti[32], and a good
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review is contained in [33] ( for a general introduction into kinetics of diffusion controlled
processes, see, for example, book [34]).
In the Garman model traders enter the market at a given price, and if their trade price
is not hit, they leave the market a certain time later – they do not change their trade price
while they have an open interest. This is a behavior characteristic of “investors”, traders
who buy and sell rarely, and hold for long periods of time, for whom trading tactics to
obtain the optimal trade price are not crucial. Many markets are in fact dominated by
trading of this kind. However, there are also markets which are dominated by professional
traders, who typically work for a sell side institution, watch the markets every minute,
and care very much about saving every basis point. The best examples this kind of market
are the interdealer broker markets, which exist for swaps, caps, floors, and the treasury
market, to name a few. This kind of trader places mainly limit orders in the market, and
may change his or her limit order price many times before trading, based on how he or she
perceives the direction of the market, the direction of related markets, changing hedging
needs, and anticipation of news bulletins. An external observer might characterize this
behavior as a random walking behavior, and that the collection of all such traders (i.e.
their limit order prices) in this market would then be seen to diffuse. This behavior stands
in contrast to those studied empirically by [26]. We wish in particular to describe the
microstructure of this type of market. We therefore shall study a model in which traders
both diffuse and annihilate. We shall then see that the diffusion property of the model
has strong and fascinating implications for microstructural behavior.
In this paper, like that of Garman and BPS, we shall study a double auction market
as a statistical system. Rather than studying the distribution of trade prices, however, we
focus on using this model to calculate scaling laws for expectations of the various quantities
that describe microstructural dynamics, e.g. the bid-offer spread, time-to-midmarket
trade, bid or offer size (or more generally, the density of traders), and deal rate. Taken
together, these four quantities describe, somewhat redundantly, the notion of liquidity.
Although liquidity itself has no unique quantitative definition, each of these quantities is
monotonic in liquidity, and we may define liquidity scaling laws as the functional behavior
of each of these in terms of the others. In this paper we shall consider liquidity scaling laws
as a function of the deal rate. Existing intuitions then govern the qualitative behavior of
these laws as follows.
The higher the deal rate, the smaller the bid-offer spread.
The higher the deal rate, the more quickly we can trade at the midmarket.
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The higher the deal rate, the greater the density of traders.
The quantities one encounters in studying market microstructure are measured over
short time scales, minutes and seconds. This feature simplifies empirical studies, but
more importantly, we argue, it simplifies the nature of the model itself. This is because
the short time scales leave little or no time for communication between traders. This
implies that we do not need to model the complicated sociological interactions that take
place when large amounts of information passes between traders – only the great press of
numbers determines scaling laws for quantities like these. ∗
Making all these intuitions into quantitative scaling laws is the principal aim of this
paper, and these present a set of new and interesting research problems. In addition to
the scaling laws associated with various measures of liquidity, there are large sets of other
interesting problems regarding internal market structure over short time scales. In this
paper, we will also investigate scaling laws concerned with details of steady state markets,
market making strategies, and a market’s response to imbalances between buyers and
sellers. We note here that scaling laws have been used before to characterize the behavior
of markets – the best known example is the Hurst exponent. However, this example
serves to highlight the difference between our work and previous work, especially [27] –
whereas scaling laws such as the Hurst exponent quantify the behavior of price evolution
in time, and so are scaling laws in the time variable, ours are concerned with issues of
price formation, and are therefore described by scaling laws with respect to liquidity.
In the next section we will demonstrate how this can be done. We shall first introduce
a mathematical framework, statistical field theory, which allows us to treat systems, such
as a market, with variable numbers of random agents, similar in this way to Garman’s
model. Then we will seek a model which is minimal, i.e. the simplest model possible which
describes the market phenomena mentioned above. We will see how these considerations
define this model almost uniquely, and will find the model to be similar to the dynamics of
the “annihilation” reaction B+S → ∅ in a one-dimensional space, a well studied problem
(for further reading see the excellent recent review [33]). While Garman [3] was the first
∗ We distinguish “sociological” interactions, the collective interaction of traders with each
other, from “psychological” interactions, the response of individual traders to changes they
perceive in the market. While sociological interactions ought not be important over these very
short time scales, psychological interactions might, if they were to act in a correlated fashion.
Our approach carries with it an implicit but important assertion, that these interactions are in
fact uncorrelated over short time scales, and therefore “wash out”, so that we may treat their
behavior as a collection of random walks.
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to introduce the analogy to this type of reaction into finance, an important element later
added to this picture was the idea of diffusion. Bak, Paczuski, and Shubik, [27] were the
first to introduce to finance a model with both diffusion and this annihilation reaction,
in a study of price evolution. Interestingly, it is the one-dimensionality of the system (a
consequence of the standardization of the trading contract) that gives this model non-
trivial dynamics. In the next section we will present a more complete argument for this
mapping of our problem onto this model, define some financially relevant variables, and
use this to show explicitly how the above scaling laws, and many more, may be calculated
within such a model.
This minimal model is very easily treated, and there already exists a considerable
body of work devoted to it in the physics and chemistry literature [33]. When we apply
this model to market microstructure, we shall find that several of the scaling laws and
correlations we seek are calculable by known analytic methods. This minimal model is
intended to describe market statistics at only the level appropriate to scaling laws, and to
this end we keep the number of parameters to a minimum. In addition to the deal rate,
we shall require only two other parameters to define the model completely – these turn
out to be the volatility (or diffusion coefficient) of individual traders, and the effective
width of the price space. By calculating and measuring any of the correlation functions
these parameters are easily inferred.
Going Beyond the Minimal Model
The notion of studying the scaling laws of a market’s internal structure may be ex-
tended beyond markets in the normal state. In this paper we shall also introduce models
which explore scaling laws in other settings. With the exception of the two-fluid model
in its crashing phase, the additional effects of these models are weak, and modify the
dominant effect of statistics only by small corrections.
– The Effect of Random Disturbances
The minimal model with which we begin this study is intended to model “quiescent”
markets. i.e. those in which deals are steadily ticking over at a constant rate, and in which
no catastrophes are occurring. We may extend ourselves beyond this most ideal regime
into others, by first considering the effects of random disturbances within the market. We
can do this by imagining that they cause trader dynamics, defined by their drift, volatility
or flux, to jump around randomly. The strength of this random noise component of these
quantities behaves somewhat like a temperature, i.e. the amount of “energy” injected
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into the market by the influence randomly occuring series of external events. We imagine
that the market is continually buffeted by a series of small jolts, that force it partially
into its excited states. The strength of this noise controls the weighting of the system in
these states, and introduces noise-strength dependent corrections to the correlations of
market observables.
– Scaling Laws in the Crashing Phase: the Two Fluid Model
A market which is in the process of a long crash does not look quiescent. However,
it is possible to regard a market in free-fall as a market in a different phase, subject to a
different sort of dynamics, but one which may be probed by the same sort of statistical
scaling laws nevertheless. It is not sufficient, for this purpose, to simply consider the
minimal model in the presence of a large imbalance between buyers and sellers, because
this would not recover the well known phenomenon of the widening of the bid-offer spread.
We believe that the missing element, ignored by the minimal model, is market order
traders. The minimal model contains only traders who enter limit orders into the system,
so that the true best bid/offer can be seen on screen, but this would not represent the
reality of a crash, during which most traders attempt to hit the best bid directly, as a
market order. To address this, we introduce a “Two-Fluid Model”, one in which there
are two flavors of buyer, B (limit order bidders)and B′ (market order bidders), and two
flavors of seller S (limit order sellers) and S ′ (market order sellers). The prices of the
unprimed traders only are used to calculate the best bid and offer on the trade screen, and
are therefore visible to other traders. Thus the Two-Fluid Model includes the reactions
B + S −→ 0, B′ + S −→ 0, and B + S ′ −→ 0, but not B′ + S ′ −→ 0, because these
primed traders are invisible to each other. This model, when the population of invisible
S ′ traders is large, now has the familiar behavior in which the bid-offer spread widens
out during a crash. We pause here to note that Bak, Paczuski, and Shubik introduced
“heterogeneous” models, too, ie. models involving more than one types of trader [27].
– The onset of crashes: the Bias Model
We have argued that the short time scales of our measurement enable us to ignore
collective, sociological effects of trader behavior, because they will not have had time
to communicate appreciably. But, if we were to consider slightly longer time scales, it
would be easy to identify the most direct and likely medium for this communication – it
is the trading screen itself, which instantly informs traders of trade prices. Over slightly
longer time scales, it also allows them to observe trends. We may get more ambitious
and attempt to go beyond the very shortest time scales, to model the most immediate of
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collective behavior. We treat an interesting model of this type in this paper, as well.
We introduce a simple model that treats trend-following behavior in traders under
the name of the “Bias Model”. The rate at which trend-following or “bias” builds up in
this model is controlled by an external parameter, which we call the “market tension”,
a property of the market which we will measure, and which we expect to be slowly
varying. When this trend-following parameter is positive, the traders’ drift is increased
each time the trade price increases, and decreased each time the trade price decreases
– this is meant to correspond to momentum-trading. When bias is negative, so that
the traders’ drift moves in the direction opposite to the trade price, this corresponds to
bargain-hunting/profit-taking.
With positive tension, this model is intended to develop instabilities which mimic
market crashes, and preliminary simulations confirm that this is so. The model builds up
bias slowly at first and, depending on the market tension parameter and the starting point
of the trader drift, the market eventually builds up enough drift to leave the diffusion-
dominated regime. At this point it goes into a ballistic regime, in which drift plays a
significant or dominant role – the crashing phase. We propose to use this model to study
scaling laws in market microstructure in the prelude to a crash.
– The Diffusion Proposal and the Dealer’s Optimization Problem: A modification of
the order arrival process
Although it is outside the main development, we shall also use our dynamical frame-
work to consider a problem in market making. We ask the question: what is the optimal
bid-offer spread that a monopolist market maker can set, as a function of time, given
that he has a view of all of the limit orders placed in the market? This dealer optimiza-
tion problem has been considered in great detail by Garman [3], Stoll[4],Ho and Stoll[5],
O’Hara and Oldfield [6], among many others. We do not wish in this paper to engage this
much more complicated topic – our intent is simply to suggest that the Poisson process
model for order arrival may be refined by using the known initial data of limit orders and
the diffusion proposal, to obtain a sharper estimate of order arrival. We introduce a sim-
ple model for maximizing profit while minimizing the net open position, which illustrates
this method.
Testing the Models
In the last section of this paper we shall discuss the testing of the predictions of these
models. We have consciously kept the number of parameters describing the model to a
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minimum, so as to isolate the effect of large numbers of traders and to make the model
easily testable. Our testing will be done in a future publication, and will concern markets
with institutional traders, and measurements will be made over very short time scales
(minutes and seconds), in a single market [35]. In this section we review the previous
studies of the spread (principally in dealer markets, which dominated by the long term
investors, not the short term traders we are interested in). We also lay out the program
for testing experimentally the scalings we have computed, and will compute, for these
models.
A Brief History of Physical Approaches to the Financial Markets
The application to financial markets of analogies to physical systems have a long his-
tory starting from Louis Bachelier[36], who first proposed the random-walk model of the
stock market. In the 1960s and 1970s these ideas became very popular and eventually lead
to the famous Black-Sholes option pricing formula [37] and to Mandelbrot’s applications
of scaling behaviour to financial markets [38]. Recently, a lot of papers have appeared in
which markets were treated as far-from-equilibrium dynamical systems [39]. It is impos-
sible here to review all relevant recent papers and areas of research of the quickly growing
field of econophysics [40]. However, we pause here to mention several notable examples,
such as work on scaling behaviour for exchange rates [41], “log-periodic” oscillations as
crash precursors [42], dynamics of the interest rate curve [43], and market fluctuations
[44, 27]. There are, of course many other deserving papers which we do not have the
space to include.
2. Development of the minimal model
In this section, we present an argument for the mapping of microstructure of the
interdealer broker markets onto a statistical field theory, in which particles diffuse and
annihilate, a well known model of chemical reactions.
Configuration Space of the Model
What is the statistical system suggested by our arguments above? Because we seek
to compute only the most dominant behavior as a function of liquidity, without the fine
detail, we construct first of all the simplest possible model which is consistent with the
proposal described in the introduction.
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Figure 1: A typical distribution of buyers (balls with letter B) and sellers (balls with
letter S). Arrows describe “hops” - not all buyers and sellers will hop in each instant of
time.
Within a simple market, we wish to investigate the scaling of the market observables
i.e. the best bid, best offer, trade price, deal rate and other things we might infer from a
trading screen. In particular, we wish to study their dependence on the number of traders
(buyers and sellers) present in the market. This requires us to treat the dynamics of the
market observables as functions of the underlying dynamics of individual traders. We do
this as follows. To each buyer we associate a price, his bid price, and to each seller his
offered price, and imagine the two types of trade prices moving around on a 1 dimensional
space we call the “price space” P. (See Figure 1) (Of course, we start our model off by
placing all seller prices above all buyer prices. ) It is convenient to regard this space as a
discrete one-dimensional lattice on which traders (i.e. their trade prices) “hop” from site
to site. In this model each trader trades in a single standard size ∗.
In this setting, each of our market observables is calculable. We shall compute a
statistical average of the market observables, and this average will run over the possible
positions of all the traders, over a suitable probability measure, specified at a time t. This
probability measure we refer to as the “state” of our system.
Dynamics of the Model
We wish to study not only the static behavior of the best bid or offer, but the dynamics
as well, so we must specify a dynamic law for the movements of the traders. This law is
∗ This is not a terribly strong restriction, because interdealer broker markets often have a
standard size in which much of their trading is done, and are often willing to break up larger
trades if necessary
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Figure 2: Annihilation B + S → 0
not completely arbitrary. Any dynamic law we may specify must guarantee that when a
buyer and a seller are at the same point in price space, they do a deal and disappear from
the market. At each moment in time, therefore, the dynamical law deletes from the state
any pair of buyers and sellers it finds occupying the same point in price space. We call
this part of the dynamics “annihilation” (See Figures 2 and 3).
As discussed in the introduction, an essential ingredient of our model is that traders in
the interdealer markets change their trade prices often while they have an open interest, in
an effectively random, uncorrelated fashion and this leads us generally toward a random
walk behavior for individual traders, and diffusion for the behavior of the aggregate. The
precise nature of this random behavior in price space is somewhat hard to know, and
depends on a trader’s psychology, etc. We do not wish to attempt to treat the details
of these effects, only the effect of the weight of numbers of traders present, an effect
which any more detailed theory would also contain. Our model in this sense should be
considered “minimal”. In keeping with the modest goal of capturing the gross, purely
statistical features of random-walking traders only, we introduce the simplest random
walk behavior, with zero drift and constant volatility for the traders (hereinafter known
as D, the trader diffusion constant, or trader volatility). Hence, our minimal model for
a trader’s price evolution process will consist of diffusion interspersed with annihilation,
i.e. it is described by a diffusion controlled (or diffusion driven) annihilation reaction. In
the physics and chemistry literature this sort of dynamics has been studied extensively,
and a good introduction is contained in [34], and references therein, as well as [33]. In
addition, the mapping of market dynamics onto diffusion-controlled annihilation was first
used by [27] to study the random process governing trade price evolution.
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Figure 3: A new distribution of buyers (balls with letter B) and sellers (balls with letter
S) after an annihilation (trade) has occured. Note that the bid-offer spread fluctuates.
Here it is bigger than in Figure 1
.
Distribution of Traders
To compute the scaling laws introduced in the previous section, we must impose a
probability measure, the state measure, on the positions of each type of trader. Although
we have specified a dynamical law for the state measure, we haven’t yet defined it until
we have also specified its initial conditions. This represents a lot of missing information,
which cannot be deduced from the conditions we have so far imposed on our model – we
must discover what kind of diffusion-annihilation dynamics is relevant to our problem.
We do this as follows. It is natural, for this kind of problem, to restrict our attention to
quiescent markets, i.e. those where catastrophes such as market crashes or large, explosive
jumps due to the injection of critical new information are not happening †. We assert here
that a quiescent market is an approximately steady state market, and thus we define our
evolving state measure, at any time t, to be that probability measure which is the steady
state solution of our diffusion-annihilation dynamics.
As a first approximation, we allow traders to enter the market only at the ends,
as though buyers began by bidding very low, and sellers by offering very high, and then
improving. This is clearly an approximation which we expect will not change the dynamics
too greatly. In a series of numerical simulations we will address the question of more
realistic insertion processes, in a future publication[45].
†Because our time scales are so short, there should be many such intervals during the day in
most markets. Indeed, most of the time, by this definition, most markets are “quiescent”.
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Like most such models we may solve this minimal model by simulation. However, we
can go much further for this model, because it happens to be similar to many well-known
analytically soluble models[46], see also [33] and may itself be soluble – in addition, there
are approximate analytical methods available [29]. Through these, the set of steady state
solutions is well understood, and it is interesting and helpful to note that the set of steady
state solutions corresponds to the lowest energy states (“ground states”) of the equivalent
physical system, and is a family indexed by a single parameter, the deal rate J . Thus,
given a deal rate, i.e. a market at a given level of liquidity, there is a unique steady
state solution to our model. The scaling laws in question may be evaluated simply as
an expectation value of the market observable in any such ground state, regarded as a
function of the choice of the ground state. Making use of this, many numerical results for
scalings have already been found, see for example [30].
The dynamical framework: statistical field theory
The State is an Evolving Measure on Sequences on the Price Space
In this section, we introduce the mathematics of our dynamical framework. It is a
variant of statistical field theory, first used by Doi [31] and Peliti [32], and it is similar
to the approach taken by Garman in his double auction model [3] and Bak-Paczuski-
Shubik[27]. The scaling laws we seek are moments of the distribution of buyers and
sellers at a slice of time t. Therefore, we do not need the full distribution on path space,
but just a time-slice of this distribution. In summary, we require a distribution on the
positions of traders at a time t, which evolves in time according to diffusion-annihilation
dynamics. It is this distribution, hereafter known as the “state measure” or just the
“state”, which shall be the dynamical variable of our model.
The measure space underlying this system is different from those one usually en-
counters in financial problems. Stochastic problems in finance are usually expressed as
stochastic differential equations, which lead to a distribution function on an underlying
sample space, say RN , of fixed dimension.
If N traders obeyed a simple diffusion law, instead of diffusion-annihilation dynamics,
we would describe the system with a set of coupled stochastic differential equations.
Solving this system would give us an evolving state measure, µ ∈MN , a measure on the
N -dimensional underlying sample space (RN , in this case). In our problem, however, the
dimension of the underlying sample space itself can change during the evolution, because
traders may exit or enter the system. The measure space in which there are exactly NT
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traders (i.e. “fixed trader number”) is but a small part of the full measure space of our
system. In fact, we would like our model to allow the possibility that the system may,
along one branch, have had a buyer and seller collide, annihilate, and remove each other
from the system, and along the other branch that they did not meet, and therefore still
remain within our system, in other words, that the system resides partly in one trader
number subspace Mnb,ns and partly in another, Mnb−1,ns−1. Here let Pnb,ns be an nb · ns
dimensional underlying sample space in which nb buyers and ns sellers are present – then
Pnb,ns is a small part of the full underlying sample space PFull = ∪nb,nsPnb,ns. Mnb,ns is
the space of measures on Pnb,ns, andMFull is the space of measures on PFull. Then we are
required to include in our full measure space linear combinations of distributions on all the
different underlying sample spaces Pnb,ns: µ =
∑
nb,ns cnb,nsµnb,ns, µ ∈ M, µnb,ns ∈ Mnb,ns
(where Mnb,ns is the space of measures on the underlying sample space Pnb,ns), and
therefore the full measure space for our stochastic system MFull is a vector space direct
sum of the measure spaces with fixed trader number MFull = ⊕nb,nsMnb,ns. MFull is the
space of measures on the full underlying sample space PFull. The norm of the projection
into each subspace Mnb,ns is the probability of having nb buyers and ns sellers. As
these probabilities must add, the norm on M is the sum of the fixed subspace norms
||µ|| = ∑nb,ns cnb,ns||µnb,ns||, µ ∈M, µnb,ns ∈Mnb,ns.
This dynamical system differs in one further respect from systems we would describe
with stochastic differential equations. The identity of traders does not matter to us – if
buyer 1 sits at site 1 and buyer 2 sits at site 2, that is the same, for us, as if buyer 1 sat at
site 2 and buyer sat at site 1. As it stands, the system keeps track of more information than
we are concerned with. We therefore identify these different configurations as the same
point in our underlying space, by modding out by the action of the permutation groups
(separately for buyers and sellers) on that space, i.e. Pnb,ns = ((P)nb/Snb)⊗ ((P)ns/Sns).
Modding out Pn by Sn is the same as restricting the measure space on Pn to symmetric
measures on Pn and, to compensate for multiple counting of configurations, adjusting the
measure by an appropriate multinomial factor ‡.
A point in Pnb,ns = ((P)nb/Snb)⊗ ((P)ns/Sns) quotient space defines only the number
of buyers and sellers sitting at each point in the price space P (the “occupation numbers”
nbx and n
s
x at x ∈ P), and is thus defined by two summable sequences of positive integers on
P, {nb(x), x ∈ P} ∈ L1(P,Z+) (for the buyers) and {ns(x), x ∈ P} ∈ L1(P,Z+) (for the
‡This factor is not a constant on Pn, and therefore this multinomial factor is in fact an
operator, which we describe in the following subsections.
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sellers). Here L1(P,Z+) is the space of positive-integer valued, summable sequences on
P. In other words, there is a bijection between L1(P,Z+)⊗L1(P,Z+) and our full space
of configurations PFull = ∪nb,nsPnb,ns. This in turn defines a norm-preserving bijection
betweenM(L1(P,Z+)⊗L1(P,Z+)) andM(PFull). This aspect of statistical field theory
is much like the Garman model[3]. Thus our states are elements of the measure space
M(PFull) =M(L1(P,Z+)⊗ L1(P,Z+)).
The Pure State Basis for the Space of State Measures, and Insertion and Deletion
Operators
The foregoing describes the mathematical system required by our proposal to study
liquidity scaling laws within the simplest possible market model. It turns out that the
configuration space we have deduced above is identical to that of statistical field theory,
used in physics and chemistry to describe systems with a variable number of particles.
Below we include a brief qualitative introduction to statistical field theory. We have
modified it slightly, following the work of Doi[31] and Peliti[32], in order to remove some
specifically quantum mechanical features which appear in standard treatments of the
field[47].
Statistical field theory is most easily introduced in a particular basis for the measure
space, that of the “pure states”. A pure state is an element ofM(PFull) =M(L1(P,Z+)⊗
L1(P,Z+)) which has all of its probability mass concentrated at a single point of PFull =
L1(P,Z+)⊗L1(P,Z+). We may describe such a point with the sequences of occupation
numbers {nbx}, {nsx} – denote this state as |{nbx, nsx : x ∈ P} >. These states form a
natural basis for M(L1(P,Z+) ⊗ L1(P,Z+)). The usual L1 norm of a measure µ =∑
{nbx,n
s
x}
P{nbx,nsx}|{nbx, nsx} > in this space is simply ||µ|| =
∑
{nbx,n
s
x}
P{nbx,nsx}.
Formally, this basis is constructed as follows, in the example of a discrete price space
such as ours. Assume, to start with, that there is only one type of trader, say buyers,
present in the market. We define the unique state |0 > which is empty of traders, and
linear operators Ψ(B)x
†
, x ∈ P which insert a buyer at x, Ψ(B)y †|{nx : x ∈ P} >= |{nx : x ∈
P, x 6= y, and nx + 1, x = y} >. Then an element of the basis alluded to above is
|{nx : x ∈ P} >=
∏
x∈P
(Ψ(B)x
†
)nx|0 > . (2.1)
These operators are known as buyer insertion, or buyer creation operators. In a sim-
ilar way we introduce the buyer deletion, or buyer destruction operators Ψ(B)x , x ∈ P,
Ψ(B)y |{nx : x ∈ P} > = |{nx : x ∈ P, x 6= y, andny − 1, x = y} > if ny > 0, and 0 other-
wise. The linear operators Ψ(B)x and Ψ
(B)
y
†
commute with each other unless x = y, in which
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case we have Ψ(B)x
†
Ψ(B)x − Ψ(B)x Ψ(B)x † = 1, in other words Ψ(B)x †Ψ(B)y − Ψ(B)y Ψ(B)x † = δxy,
where δxy is the Kronecker delta. (In the case where P is a continuous space, we write
the above as Ψ(B)x
†
Ψ(B)y −Ψ(B)y Ψ(B)x † = δ(x− y), where the right hand side is Dirac’s delta
function.) For each x ∈ P we may define operators N (B)x whose eigenvectors are the
basis elements |{nx : x ∈ P} >, and whose eigenvalues are the occupation numbers nbx as
N (B)x = Ψ
(B)
x
†
Ψ(B)x . This operator goes by the name of the occupation number operator,
but in our context it is sensible to call it the buyer number operator.
The Norm on our Measure Space – a Single Kind of Trader
With this in hand, we may define the appropriate statistical field theory norm < · >
(due to Doi[31] and Peliti [32]) in terms of the function F on pure states F(µ) = 1 if
µ = |0 > and 0 otherwise, which we extend as a linear operator to all states. In terms of
this function F(·), we define < µ >= F(exp(∑xΨ(B)x )µ). Here the exponential factor is
precisely the operator that introduces the correct multinomial factors into the subspace
measures, to compensate for overcounting of configurations in our representation of the
configuration space as positive integer sequences on P. Because of the presence of this
factor, the averaged density of traders may be calculated as < Ψ(B)
†
(x)Ψ(B)(x) > = <
Ψ(B)(x) >. Note that the coefficients P{nbx} of the pure states are proportional to, but
not equal to, the probability of the occurrence of that state. We refer to this as the
“probability amplitude”.
This treatment of Doi’s work is different from that in his paper, so here we relate
our exposition of Doi’s work to his own. Statistical field theory is normally used in the
context of quantum theory, which demands a conjugation operation, an L2 norm, and
inner product, making the space a Hilbert space H: a, b ∈ H −→< a|b >∈ C. Doi embeds
his formulation inside this Hilbert space. He does this by introducing a special state
< SUM |
< SUM | =< 0|∏
i
exp(
∑
x
Ψ(x)) (2.2)
with the property
< SUM |Ψ† =< SUM |
and he defines the L1 norm in terms of the L2 space inner product as ||Ψ||1 =< SUM |Ψ >
The Norm on a Space with a Second Type of Trader: Sellers
We may of course have more than one type of trader in our system, and it is essential
that we do. We introduce a basis containing a complete set of occupation states for sellers,
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so that a full basis for our measure space is |{nbx, nsx : x ∈ P} >, and along with the buyer
insertion and deletion operators Ψ(B)x
†
,Ψ(B)x , we introduce the seller insertion and deletion
operators Ψ(S)x
†
, Ψ(S)x . Similarly we define the seller number operator N
(S)
x = Ψ
(S)
x
†
Ψ(S)x .
The standard norm of a measure µ =
∑
{nbx},{n
s
x}
P{nbx},{nsx}|{nbx}, {nsx} > in this expanded
space is simply
∑
{nbx},{n
s
x}
P{nbx},{nsx}, and so the norm we will use for expectations is <
µ >= F(exp(∑xΨ(B)x ) exp(∑xΨ(S)x )µ)
We May Allow Trader Types with Several Different Kinds of Behavior
In analogy with the case of sellers, we may introduce completely new species of traders,
such as the market order traders of the two-fluid model, or traders with different dynamical
behavior (e.g. momentum traders, as in the bias model, see section 4). We may even
introduce other species still, which are not traders at all, but serve to communicate
information between traders (see appendix). A species may have a completely different
kind of dynamics, or even no dynamics at all. One important example of additional
species that we shall need to introduce is the non-diffusing, externally controlled trader
(either buyer or seller) which annihilates traders of the other type, but does not diffuse,
and may not leave the market after trading (e.g. a specialist who sets a bid price and
an offered price, good for any size, and stays in the market (see section 3). . We denote
these as Ψ(·),(e)x , Ψ
(·),(e)
x
†
, where (·) stands for either (B) or (S).
The Fundamental Variables of the Theory are Operators on the State Measure
The linear operators Ψ(·)x , Ψ
(·)
x
†
, and N (·)x are actually maps from the price space P into
the set of linear operators on the measure space. Following the terminology of statistical
field theory, we shall refer to such operators as “field operators” or “fields”.
The Ψ s and Ψ† s are the building blocks of all computation in statistical field theory.
Consider any market observable, e.g. the best bid B. It is possible to define (in terms of Ψ s
and Ψ† s) an associated linear operator Bˆ, that acts on pure states |nx > by multiplication
by the best bid of that pure state. The action of this operator on the measure defining the
state of our system |state >= ∑{nx} P{nx}|{nx} > gives another measure |b >= Bˆ|state >,
whose expansion coefficients in the pure state basis is the best bid of the pure state times
its probability amplitude in |state >: |b >= B{nx}P{nx}|{nx} >. Its norm is therefore
equal to the expectation value of the best bid < B >t= ||Bˆ|state, t > ||
We may use this procedure for evaluating any desired expectation value in statistical
field theory. We construct the appropriate operator using the Ψs and Ψ†s, apply this
operator to our (time dependent) state measure |state, t >, and evaluate its norm, thus
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< Op >= ||Oˆp|state, t > ||. We construct several of these operators in the next section.
We shall use this procedure throughout this paper, but in a modified form. The
time evolution operator Ut,t′ satisfies |state, t′ >= Ut,t′ |state, t >. Thus, the expectation
of any observable A at a time t is< A >t= ||Aˆ|state, t > || = ||AˆUt,0|state, 0 > || =
||U−1t,0 AˆUt,0|state, 0 > ||. We define the time dependent version of an operator A via its
conjugation with U : Aˆ(t) = U−1t,0 AˆUt,0. We may write operator expectations as < A >t=
||Aˆ(t)|state, 0 > ||.
Dimensional Analysis and the Parameters of Diffusion-Controlled Annihilation
Diffusion-annihilation dynamics consists of diffusions interspersed with annihilations,
for each species of trader. We may construct both a diffusion operator D(·) and an anni-
hilation operator Uann from the set {Ψ(·)x ,Ψ(·)x †}, x ∈ P, in order to assemble a diffusion-
annihilation operator that evolves a state forward in time within our model. Although
we shall postpone a discussion of these operators to the appendix, we shall make one
important comment about the dynamics of the model. The operator evolution equation (
see appendix 7.1) may be differentiated to yield an operator differential equation. In gen-
eral, if a partial differential equation is invariant under the change of dependent variables
x −→ αx, t −→ βt, then its solutions are also invariant, and this is a powerful constraint
on the form of its solutions. More commonly, however, PDEs are changed into a different,
but similar equations. However, this invariance property may be given to any PDE at all,
provided that there are constants in front of each term that are defined to scale in the
appropriate way under the abovementioned transformation, and by this method we may
infer strong constraints on the way the solution depends on these constants, those in the
boundary conditions, and the dependent variables t and x. The scaling of these constants
is known as their dimensions, and the (generally very simple) analysis to determine the
constraints they imply on the solutions is known as dimensional analysis.
In our case, there is only one coefficient necessary in the PDE, the diffusion coefficient
D, with dimensions x2/t, i.e. D ∼ (dollars)2/(sec). In addition, there is a dimensionful
constant in the boundary conditions, J , the rate at which traders enter the market at
the boundaries, which in a steady state market is equal to the deal rate, with dimension
J ∼ 1/(sec). Thus the expectation < X > of any quantity X with dimensions [X ] =
(dollar)m/secn must be proportional to (D/J)m/2Jn ∼ Jn−m/2. In particular, lengths
in the model scale as
√
D/J . As the foregoing analysis has been for a continuous price
space, note that the quantities < X > must converge to something well-defined in the
continuum limit.
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In the foregoing, we have defined the number operator N (·)(x), an operator which gives
the number of traders sitting at point x, in a pure state. It is, of course, dimensionless.
This operator is very closely related to another operator, the density operator ρ(·)(x),
which gives the number of traders per unit length near point x. They are related as
ρ(·)(x) = N (·)(x)/δS, where δS is the lattice spacing. In this case it is the trader density
< ρ(x) >, and not < N(x) >, which has a good continuum limit, and so < ρ >∼
√
J/D
Note that our discussion of dimensional analysis has ignored the lattice spacing δS,
which is actually another dimensionful quantity on which these scalings may depend.
The length of the price space L has also been omitted. These two represent the lower
and upper limits of the length scales in our model, and if we were to imagine a Fourier
analysis of the dynamics, most of the dynamics takes place far from these two scales,
in the intermediate regime. As a result, dynamical quantities tend to depend slowly
at best on these quantities, often adding logarithmic corrections to scaling laws. As a
result, it is correct, generally speaking, to ignore these length scales in a dimensional
analysis of scaling behavior. Numerical simulations of this model [30] have borne out
these arguments.
Parametrizations of the Reaction Front
A model of this kind allows us to calculate the relationships described in the intro-
duction, but also many more. In general, if we start this model with any initial state
satisfying the initial condition above, it will evolve to a state with a “reaction front”.
This is a region within the state where the buyers meet the sellers. At the center of the
reaction front is, of course, the best bid, best offer and midmarket. Beyond the best
bid/best offer we expect to see an increasing density of buyers/sellers.
A stationary reaction front corresponds to an approximately steady state situation
similar to the ground state introduced in the previous section. Buyers and sellers approach
each other, meet near the center, and annihilate. At the same time, traders are injected
into the system at a rate equal to the deal rate.
The statistics that we read off of a trading screen describe the shape and dynamics of
the reaction front – the best bid locates the top of the lower edge and the best offer the
bottom of the upper edge (see Figures 1 and 3). The bid size tells us the height at the
best bid point, and the offer size tells us a similar thing about the best offer point. And
the last trade field tells us about its recent history.
Generally we are interested in all parameters which describe this reaction front, its
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shape and its dynamics. The bid-offer spread is but one, albeit the most important, of
the parameters describing the shape of the reaction front.
Within a pure state, we may describe the shape fully, at a time t, by specifying the
number of buyers ρB(x, t) and sellers ρS(x, t) at each point x of the price space. Obviously
ρB(x, t) = 0 for x greater than the best bid, and ρS(x, t) = 0 for x less that the best offer.
The number of sellers between xℓ and xu is then
∑xu
x=xℓ
ρS(x, t).
Equivalently, we may describe the shape by specifying, for all n, the point XB(n, t)
in price space above which exactly n buyers may be found, and the point XS(n, t) below
which exactly n sellers may be found. X(n, t) is the inverse of the function f(x, t) =∑x
x′=0 ρ(x
′, t). The best bid B(t) is then B(t) = XB(1, t), and the best offer O(t) is
then O(t) = XS(1, t). And we may interpret XB(n, t) as the tender price necessary
to make n purchases (immediately), and the price paid for the n purchases would be∑XS(n,t)
x xρS(x, t).
We may then express the density of traders near the best bid as SB as SB(t) =
ρB(B(t), t), and the density near the best offer SO similarly as SO(t) = ρS(O(t), t). Of
course, the bid-offer spread is then Spr(t) = O(t)− B(t), and the midmarket is M(t) =
(1/2)(B(t) + O(t)). Note that B(t), S(t), and M(t) are not Markov random variables,
and do not satisfy a stochastic differential equation, because they are subject to jumps.
Finally, the trading screen describes more than just the shape of the reaction front,
because it also describes the history of trades, through the last trade price χ(t), and
through the instantaneous deal rate (trading volume/sec) J . We show how these are
parametrized in the appendix.
Digression on the history of Diffusion-Controlled Annihilation in the phys-
ical and chemical literature.
The foregoing arguments have established the nature of our model, commonly known
in the physics and chemistry literature as steady state diffusion- driven annihilation in
one dimension. We pause here to mention previous work on this and related subjects. As
previously mentioned, our model considers a steady state market, in which buyers and
sellers are injected into the system at a rate J which precisely compensates the losses due
to annihilations . However, one can also consider the nonstationary situation in which no
traders are injected to compensate for the annihilations – in this case the width of the
reaction front grows with time. In the initial paper by Ga´lfi and Ra´cz [28] the properties
of the reaction front in a system with segregated initial conditions were studied in the
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mean field approximation. The mean field approximation is one which approximates the
state by a Gaussian centered on the most heavily weighted configuration, and ignores
higher, non-Gaussian corrections, known as “fluctuations”. It works well for dynamics in
three dimensional space, but breaks down in lower dimensions due to the important role of
microscopic density fluctuations in one and two-dimensional systems and in one dimension
their influence is particularly important §. Numerical simulations were performed in [30],
and showed, among other things that reaction rates are a Gaussian function of x ∈ P.
Analytical calculations by Cardy et. al. [29] confirmed these numerical results.
Let us also note the paper by Bak, Paczuski and Shubik (BPS)[27] where a model based
on diffusion-controlled annihilation was first applied to the stock market. These authors
introduce a series of models based on diffusion-controlled annihilation as a route towards
recovering the observed Levy-Pareto ”fat-tail” distributions which are said to describe
the medium term evolution of the stock-market. The diffusion-controlled annihilation
process is modified by various forms of sociological interaction, similar in philosophy to
our bias model. It is further modified by the presence of so-called ”rational traders” each
with a different strategy, that set their bids and offers according to their own individual
expectations. The rational traders in this model are non-identical, whereas the non-
rational “noise” traders are identical to one another, and so the pure noise trader case,
which they discuss at length, has the same dynamics as our minimal model. Buyers
who are deleted from the market, however, are re-inserted randomly as sellers, and vice
versa. The full BPS model, from which they obtain their best results, gets its unique
and interesting dynamics from the various different (history dependent) strategies which
must wrestle with one another in order to find a (possibly non-existent) equilibrium. This
model, while based on diffusion-controlled annihilation, is quite different from our model,
and certainly more complicated. Nevertheless, the success of a model based on diffusion-
controlled annihilation in reproducing observed statistics of trade prices provides some
encouragement for our rather different, but related project of liquidity scaling laws.
3. The Scaling Laws.
We now proceed to a description of each of the research problems to which we alluded
§ In a series of papers Cardy et. al. [29] shows how this obstacle may be partially overcome,
and we shall use his method in the Analytical Results section
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in the introduction. We write down an expression which computes each scaling law in
terms of the expectations of the operators in the previous section. Where necessary,
we provide background, or define additional terms and notation. We write down what
qualitative intuition tells us about the limits of the scaling law. In addition, for a few
of the simpler problems, dimensional analysis is sufficient to compute the scaling laws
directly, or a scaling form (for the minimal model) and we include these formulas as
well. In these cases, the consistency of intuition with the results of dimensional analysis
provides a satisfying and nontrivial check on our method. More generally, of course, these
scaling laws will be evaluated by numerical simulation and we will report on these results
in a future publication[45].
In the introduction it was mentioned that there are several other problems beyond the
liquidity scaling laws which we may investigate with this model, leading to scaling laws
beyond those discussed in the first section. We would like to draw the reader’s attention
to this point. This is, in fact, one of the most appealing features of this arena of research
– there is a very large and diverse set of financially meaningful scalings that are easy to
measure, easy to calculate, and should only require a simple statistical model, such as
the models discussed in this paper, to make reasonably accurate predictions. As with
the liquidity scaling laws, there is an obvious qualitative intuition which we may use as a
guide and sanity check.
Furthermore, these additional scalings are not empty mathematical abstractions. Their
qualitative behavior is readily apparent to market practitioners, and they are readily mea-
sured – they are correlations of quantities such as the best bid, best offer, trader density
∗, trade price, etc. which are directly observable in the marketplace.
Liquidity Scaling Laws
Liquidity in markets is measured in several different ways, using several different quan-
tities, as proxies. The most common are the deal rate J , the time to midmarket sale, the
bid-offer spread, and the trader densities near the best bid/offer. As these quantities all
measure the same thing, they must all be monotonic functions of one another. We list
these relations here, expressed as expectations of field operators discussed in the previous
section, evaluated in the measure which is the steady state solution of our dynamics. This
state measure depends on the deal rate J , and we include whatever information might be
inferred about this dependence from dimensional analysis.
∗this quantity can not usually be read off of a trade screen reliably, but may be observed by
active intervention into the market.
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• Bid Offer Spread
Spr =< O(t)− B(t) > (3.1)
• Trade price variance
w2 =< χ2(t) > − < χ(t) >2 (3.2)
• Fluctuations in the Bid-Offer Spread
(∆Spr)2 =< (O(t)− B(t))2 > − < O(t)−B(t) >2 (3.3)
We expect both Spr(J) and w2 −→ 0 as J −→∞. Both the bid offer spread and w
have dimension of dollars, so dimensional analysis suggests Spr(J) ∼
√
D/J , w(J) ∼√
D/J consistent with intuition. Using the results of [29] we shall show in the
next section that there is a logarithmic correction to the the results of dimensional
analysis, so that we have w(J) ∼ J−1/2 ln J for finite size price space. Cardy’s
method will further enable us to calculate the auto-correlation function of trade
prices W (τ) =< χ(t+ τ)χ(t) > − < χ(t) >< χ(t+ τ) >. In addition, it is possible,
and possibly quite informative, to measure the fluctuations in the spread ∆Spr.
This has the same dimensions as the spread itself, and so the same scaling law.
• Time to MidMarket Sale/Purchase (with certainty 1− ǫ)
τS = g(1− ǫ); f(τ) =< Jecum(t + τ)Ψ†e(M(t), t) >; g(f(x)) = x (3.4)
Ψ†e(M(t), t) inserts a non-diffusing trader at the mid market, who trades without
ever leaving the market, i.e. he annihilates his counterparty, but not himself. J (e)cum(t)
is the cumulative deal rate operator, which computes the number of deals transacted
with the trader (e) during time interval t (see Appendix). This quantity evaluates
the average time he must wait before he is hit or lifted. This is not the only way
to compute τS, however. Another way to calculate τS, for example, is to study the
decay rate of an excited state of a steady state market with a Ψ†e(M(t), t) inserted
at time t:
d/dt ln < Ψ†e(M(t), t) >= −(1/τS) (3.5)
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.We expect τS −→ 0 as J −→ ∞. Because the dimension of τS is sec, dimensional
analysis suggests τS ∼ J−1, consistent with intuition.
A similar quantity was considered in the framework of a continuous price space by
Cohen-Maier-Schwartz-Whitcomb [8], who showed that the probability of a limit
order trade does not go continuously to 1 as a putative limit order bid approaches
the best offer. This came about because the random process for the best offer was
taken to be a finite sum of N Poisson processes, approaching a Wiener process in
the limit N −→∞. Under these assumptions, the anomalous probability behavior,
and the existence of a non-infinitesimal bid-offer spread was proved, which however
vanishes in the Wiener limit. Because our traders are considered to readily change
their bid and offer prices, the analysis of Cohen-Maier-Schwartz-Whitcomb would
require N very large, near to the Wiener limit, leading us to expect the probability
of trading to go to 1 as a limit order bid is placed near to the best offer. In both
models, τS −→ 0 as J −→ ∞.
• Density near the best bid/offer as a function of deal rate
For a small intervals or price space ∆p, ΞB(x, t) represents the number bids we can
hit in the vicinity of the price, between B(t) + x and B(t) + x+∆p
ΞˆB(x, t) = ρB(B(t) + x, t) ΞˆO(x, t) = ρO(O(t) + x, t) (3.6)
ΞB(x, t) =< ΞˆB(x, t) > ΞO(x, t) =< ΞˆO(x, t) > (3.7)
This quantity provides to us information about the ease with which we can move the
market, and the transaction costs of trading in large volume all at once. We expect
ΞB,ΞO −→∞ as J −→∞. Dimensional analysis leads to the scaling law Ξ(·)(0) ∼
(J/D)1/2, and Ξ(·)(∆x) has the scaling form Ξ(·)(∆x) = (J/D)
1/2f(J∆x2/D).
The expressions above are the mathematical formulation of the qualitative laws dis-
cussed in the introduction. In a future publication, we shall go beyond simple dimensional
analysis, and report on results from actual numerical simulations of the model[45].
Higher Correlation Functions Describing Equilibrium
Beyond scaling laws directly associated with liquidity, there are many others which
explore the dynamical behavior of an equilibrium market. These quantities are normally
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associated with correlations of operators at different times, and/or conditioning of the
expectation. The time differences ∆ti between the different operators,and the conditioning
parameters now enter our calculations as new dimension-ful parameters. This weakens
the power of dimensional analysis, because there is no longer a single, unique dimension-
ful combination of parameters which matches the dimensions of the operator we are
averaging. Thus, for example, correlation functions will have different J dependence
for small τ << 1/J and large τ >> 1/J . One may consider following functions:
• Correlation of Changes in Best Bid with Changes in Best Offer
For any quantity f(t), define ∆τf(t) = f(t+ τ)− f(t).
C∆tB ∆tO(τ) =
< (B(t+ τ)−B(t))(O(t+ τ)−O(t)) >√
< (B(t + τ)− B(t))2 >< (O(t+ τ)−O(t))2 >
(3.8)
When the best bid snaps back after a trade, it moves down. When, at the same
moment the best offer snaps back it moves up. Afterwards, the best bid resumes
diffusing upward, while the best offer then diffuses back downward. We therefore
expect that, if we look forward only over time scales much shorter than one dealing
time,τD ∼ 1/J ,
CBO(τ) −→ < dB(t)/dt dO(t)/dt) >√
< dB(t)/dt >2 < dO(t)/dt >2
−→ −1 (3.9)
Dimensional analysis suggests that < dB(t)/dt dO(t)/dt) >∼ −DJ
But when we look forward over many dealing times, the market will have moved to
one centered around a completely new midmarket, and the best bid and best offer
will follow, together. For these time scales τ >> 1/J , CBO(τ) −→ 1, if that new
midmarket is centered sufficiently far away.
• Density at/near Best Bid/Offer conditioned on Fluctuations in Best Bid/Offer:
ΞB(σB) =
< ρB(B(t), t)I((B(t)− B¯)2 = σ2B) >
< I((B(t)− B¯)2 = σ2B) >
= E(ρB(B(t), t)|(B(t)− B¯)2 = σ2B) (3.10)
I(·) is the indicator function. (For simplicity, we discuss only the bid – the offer side
case is, of course, identical). If the density of buyers is higher, then we can expect
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that the best bid does not need to snap back as far when it jumps back to the next
best bid. We therefore expect that ΞB will be small at large σB, and large at small
σB. As σB represents an additional dimension-ful parameter, with dimensions of
(dollars), we cannot use dimensional analysis to infer the J dependence of ΞB(σB),
however we do know that it will be of the form ΞB(σB) =
√
J/Df( D
Jσ2
B
). Here
f is an unknown function of a single variable, whose expansion in its argument
must contain only negative powers. We may generalize this quantity to explore the
density beyond the best bid/offer, as follows.
ΞB(σB,∆x) =
< ρB(B(t) + ∆x, t)I((B(t)− B¯)2 = σ2B) >
< I((B(t)− B¯)2 = σ2B) >
(3.11)
This is a more complicated quantity, whose Laurent expansion coefficients may be
treated in a similar way.
• Time Change in Spread conditioned on Spread: We define the conditional expecta-
tion
∆τSpr(s0) =
< (∆τSpr(t)I(Spr(t) = s0) >
< I(Spr(t) = s0) >
= E(∆τSpr(t)|Spr(t) = s0) (3.12)
where I(·) is the indicator function. The spread in a double auction market starts
out wide, then narrows slowly until the bid and offer meet, at which point a deal is
made and the best bid and offer snap back. Thus the expected change in time of
the spread (∆Spr(t)Spr(t + τ) − Spr(t)) conditioned on the value of the spread is
small and negative for large values of the spread, and large and positive for small
values of the spread. The zero point of this function may be interpreted as the
average width at which a deal becomes imminent (the price is “irresistible”). When
τ is close to zero, so that the expectation is a derivative, there is a scaling form
for this quantity as well – ∆tSpr(s0) ∼
√
D/Jf( D
Js20
), where again f is an unknown
function of a single variable. Because of our intuition that ∆tSpr increases sharply
as the value s0 of Spr decreases, it is reasonable to expect that the unknown function
f(x) −→∞ as x −→∞.
Market Response to a Disequilibrium of Buyers and Sellers
When shocked into a state of disequilibrium, a market will go through changes to
its internal structure as it finds a new equilibrium. We may study the characteristic
rates and magnitudes of these changes, to each of the several parameters describing
an equilibrium market.
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• Response Functions to Density Imbalance: We define the conditional expectations
RB(t, τ) =
< ∆τB(t)I(ρO(O(t), t)− ρB(B(t), t) = ∆ρ) >
< I(ρO(O(t), t)− ρB(B(t), t) = ∆ρ) >
= E(∆τB(t)|ρO(O(t), t)− ρB(B(t), t) = ∆ρ)
RO(t, τ) =
< ∆τO(t)I(ρ(O(t), t)− ρ(B(t), t) = ∆ρ) >
< I(ρ(O(t), t)− ρ(B(t), t) = ∆ρ) >
RJ (t, τ) =
< ∆J(t)I(ρ(O(t), t)− ρ(B(t), t) = ∆ρ) >
< I(ρ(O(t), t)− ρ(B(t), t) = ∆ρ) > (3.13)
where I(·) is the indicator function. From these response functions we may derive
characteristic parameters for the market’s response to a small disturbance, such as
the response time τR to a density imbalance, or the expected size of the movement,
of any one of the response functions, e.g. RB, due to a density imbalance ∆RB =
RB(t, τ) − limτ→0RB(t, τ). For τR we expect that, as J −→ ∞, τ −→ 0, and
dimensional analysis suggests that τR ∼ J−1 † . For ∆RB , we expect that as
J −→ ∞, ∆RB −→ 0, and as τ −→ ∞, ∆RB −→ finite. In addition, as τ −→ 0,
this quantity becomes a derivative times τ , so that ∆RB ∼ τ
√
DJ , and as J −→ 0,
∆RB −→ ∞. Dimensional analysis suggests the scaling form ∆RB
√
D/Jf(Jτ),
with limx−→∞ f(x) = finite, and limx−→0 ∼ x. ∆RB ∼ J−1. Of particular interest
is the final resting place of the best bid, ∆RB(τ =∞).
Transaction Costs
• Expected Profits for a Specialist: Given a Bid Offer Spread set by a specialist, what
is the expected profit or loss?
This problem has been studied in the context of market makers by [3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 21,
12]. Here we study the specialist problem, using our diffusion-annihilation model.
A specialist sets a bid and an offer price in the market to provide liquidity, and
makes a profit from the spread, just as a market maker does. However, he doesn
not monopolize trading – other limit order traders may trade with each other. This
†In fact, as it is reasonable to expect a response to density imbalance proportional to the
magnitude, we may expect an exponential behavior in the response function, and may in that
case define τR as τ
−1
R = −d/dτ lnR(t, τ).
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problem therefore retains the difficulties of a double auction market and requires
treatment by statistical field theory. A full treatment also requires consideration of
the effects of inventory, asymmetric information, and other traditional aspects of
the market maker problem.
A specialist sets the width and midmarket of his quoted prices, in order to maximize
profits and minimize risk. Define the net profit/loss as the sum of all of netted out
positions PN(t) after time t, and define a second quantity to be the net open position
PO(t) after time t.
fi = J
(ei)
cum(t
′)Ψ†B(e1)(M(t)−∆B, t)Ψ†S(e2)(M(t) + ∆S, t) (3.14)
PN = min
i=1,2
fi PO = (f2 − f1) (3.15)
Ψ† inserts an external non-diffusing trader, who trades without ever leaving the
market, ie.e he annihilates his counterparty, but not himself. J (ei)cum measures the
total volume of trades for the trader (ei).
We define a good market-making strategy as one that results in a positive expected
profit, and zero expected net open position, i.e. < PO(t) > = 0, < PN(t) > > 0
for all t. In addition, we may define the fluctuations in both of these quantities
< P 2O(t) > − < PO(t) >2, and < P 2N(t) > − < PN(t) >2. They define the
two sources of uncertainty for a market making strategy, and we may use them to
measure the risk/reward ratio of a particular strategy for setting the market maker’s
bid and offer.
• Tender Offer:
How far above the best offer ∆xN must we bid in order to attract a given number
of sellers N within a specified time tT , with certainty 1− ǫ?
The operator expectation we must construct is very similar to the one in the item
above.
f(∆x) =< J (e)cum(t+∆t)Ψ
†
B(e)(O(t) + ∆x, t) +
O(t)+∆x∑
O(t)
δSρB(O(t) + s) >
∆XN (∆t) = f
−1(ǫ) (3.16)
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Ψ†B(e) inserts an external non-diffusing trader who trades once, and disappears from
the market. J (e)cum measures the total value of the trades done through this trader.
Recall that δS is the lattice spacing. For ∆t = 0, this quantity simplifies greatly, to
just
∆XN(∆t = 0) =< XB(N, t) > (3.17)
which scales as
√
D/J .
We expect that, as J −→∞, ∆XN −→ 0, and conversely, as J −→ 0, ∆XN −→∞.
We also expect that, when ∆t −→ ∞, ∆XN −→ finite, and ∆t −→ 0, ∆XN −→<
XB(N, t) >, and that ∆xN is monotonic.
Dimensional analysis predicts that ∆XN(∆t) has the scaling form∆XN ∼
√
D/Jg(J∆t),
and this implies that g(x) is finite and monotonic in both the limits x −→ 0, and
x −→ ∞. Note that the consistency of these limits is a nontrivial check on the
dimensional analysis result.
Analytical Results
Thus far we have discussed the predictions of our model in terms of computer simu-
lations and dimensional analysis. In addition, however, many analytical approximation
schemes also have been developed for statistical field theory. Although numerical results
will be more precise, these methods supplement numerical simulations of the model by
providing intuition.
Cardy et. al. [29] has developed one such approximation using a method known as
mean field theory, in the context of a model of chemical reactions in one dimension. Mean
field theory replaces the evolution equations for the operators with a partial differential
equation for the density configuration with the greatest probability mass, ignoring others
that may be contained within the state (known as the “fluctuations” away from the mean
field). This scheme is particularly interesting because he retains some of he effects of
the fluctuations by deriving an effective noise term. Mean field theory, however, is not
a systematic approximation scheme – it has no system of higher order corrections, and
there is no known error estimate. Furthermore, the scheme allows us only to calculate a
small subset of the scaling laws of the previous section. However, its predictions coincide
nicely with numerical simulations[29, 30].
A model of chemical reactions must differ from a model of market microstructure
in certain respects. First, the configuration space for a chemical species can only be
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continuous, in contrast to our discrete price space P. Also, chemical reactions differ from
deals in a marketplace, in that they occur with only a finite probability per unit time
λ when the reactants have been joined, whereas exchange rules guarantee an immediate
trade when a bid coincides with an offer. Thus the chemical model has the following time
evolution operator
Uλ(t, t
′) = expHλ(t
′ − t)
Hλ =
∫ L/2
−L/2
dx
[
Ψ¯b
(
−D∇2Ψb
)
+ Ψ¯s
(
−D∇2Ψs
)
+ (3.18)
λ
(
Ψ¯bΨ¯s − 1
)
ΨbΨs − Ψ¯bJδ(x+ L)− Ψ¯sJδ(x− L)
]
which may be derived from a master equation describing the evolution of probability
distributions (see for example [29] and references therein, see also the Appendix). The first
two terms describe diffusion of B and S particles, the next two terms describe annihilation
B + S → 0 and the last two terms are necessary to insert B and S particles at the edges
of the system at the rate J . The size of the system is L, and our model corresponds to
the limit λ −→∞. ‡
In this section we shall outline Cardy et. al. method, and give several results for the
minimal model. In later sections, where possible, we shall also present results for some of
the extended models.
In general, mean field theory leads to a system of scalar partial differential equations.
These are obtained as the extrema of a functional Sλ of the fields Ψ¯b(x, t), Ψ¯s(x, t), Ψb(x, t)
and Ψs(x, t), Sλ[Ψ¯b, Ψ¯s,Ψb,Ψs], which is associated with the evolution operator (3.18)
Sλ =
∫ t
t′
dt
∫ L/2
−L/2
dx
[
Ψ¯b
(
∂Ψb
∂t
−D∇2Ψb
)
+ Ψ¯s
(
∂Ψs
∂t
−D∇2Ψs
)
+ (3.21)
λ
(
Ψ¯bΨ¯s − 1
)
ΨbΨs − Ψ¯bJδ(x+ L)− Ψ¯sJδ(x− L)
]
‡ This operator differs from that given in the appendix in that it corresponds to
exp (H
(B)
Diff(t− t′) +H(S)Diff(t− t′) +Hann(t− t′)), (3.19)
instead of
exp (H
(B)
Diff(t− t′) +H(S)Diff(t− t′)) expHann(t− t′). (3.20)
Because the arguments of the exponential are operators, these are not the same, and in partic-
ular, it not yet known whether this allows for some overlap of buyers and sellers, even in the
limit λ −→ ∞, whereas it is explicit in the form given in the appendix.
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These partial differential evolution equations can be obtained by varying with respect
to Ψ¯b,s after a change of variables, the redefinition Ψ¯b,s → Ψ¯b,s + 1. Neglecting the
nonlinear term λΨ¯bΨ¯sΨbΨs one gets the standard reaction rate equations for the densities
ρB,S(x, t) =< Ψb,s(x, t) >
(∂t −D∂2x)ρB + λρBρS − Jδ(x+ L) = 0;
(∂t −D∂2x)ρS + λρBρS − Jδ(x− L) = 0 (3.22)
and one finds a particularly simple equation for the quantity ζ(x, t) = ρB(x, t)− ρS(x, t),
which may be interpreted as the density difference of buyers and sellers.
dζ
dt
−D∇2ζ = 0
This equation is independent of the reaction rate λ, so the limit λ −→ ∞ is obviated. It
can be shown [29] that to take into account fluctuations one has to take into account the
nonlinear term Ψ¯bΨ¯sΨbΨs which effectively adds a noise term in the right hand part of
diffusion equation
dζ
dt
−D∇2ζ = η (3.23)
The equation retains some of the stochastic character of the original system through the
noisy source term η. η is a noise term, satisfying < η >= 0, and
< η(x, t)η(x′, t′) >= 2Rδ(t− t′)δ(x− x′) (3.24)
Here R is a function describing the local reaction rate at x, the number of reactions
(deals) per unit length per unit time, which has been shown [30] to have the scaling form
R(x) = (J/D)S(x/w), where w is the width of the reaction front. After integrating R
over x one has
∫
dxR(x) = J . We seek solutions to this equation with constant flux on
the boundaries, whose noise-averaged value is zero at the center of the front. We enforce
the condition that the noise-averaged slope at the boundaries is ∼ −J/D, so that the
inward flux of buyers and sellers at the boundaries is maintained at J . We solve this
equation on the closed interval [−L/2, L/2] ⊂ R, which here plays the role of the price
space P. We write the most general solution as an expansion in Fourier modes
ζ(x, t) = −(J/D)x+∑
n=0
χn(t) cos
(
(2n+ 1)πx
L
)
(3.25)
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where the χn are the time dependent, noise dependent Fourier coefficients.
χn(t) =
2
L
∫ t
0
dt′
∫
dx′η(x′, t′) cos
(
(2n+ 1)πx′
L
)
exp
[
(2n+ 1)2π2D
L2
(t′ − t)
]
(3.26)
Modes n with wavelengths L
(2n+1)
< w oscillate many times within the reaction front, and
therefore do not contribute to the sum (3.25). We may therefore simplify the calculation
by approximating the noise source η, distributed by the sharply peaked envelope function
R, as a point source at the origin,
η(t) =
1√
2J
∫
dx′η(x′, t′)dx′; (3.27)
< η(t)η(t′) >= δ(t− t′) 1
2J
∫
dxR(x) = δ(t− t′) (3.28)
and restricting the sum over n to 0 < n < Nmax =
L
w
§.
The quantity ζ(x, t) represents the difference between the density of buyers and sellers
at the point x, at time t. This is not directly one of the quantities we are interested in,
but it is related. The zero point of ζ represents the center of the market, the midmarket
M(t), ζ(M(t), t) = 0. Since the density difference goes through its zero point linearly with
slope ∼ −J/D, its fluctuations at the point x = 0 are proportional to the fluctuations
of the position of the zero of ζ , i.e. the midmarket. Thus, the midmarket position M(t)
may be written (neglecting terms of order < M2 > /L2 << 1)
M(t)− M¯ = D
J
ζ(0, t) =
D
J
Nmax∑
n=0
χn(t) (3.29)
where we have allowed for the possibility M¯ =< M > 6= 0 even though < M >= 0 in
(3.25). The noise averaged value of M(t)− M¯ is 0, but the noise dependent terms cause
it to fluctuate, and we may calculate the magnitude of these fluctuations
w2 =
D2
J2
(< ζ2(0, t) > − < ζ(0, t) >2) = D
2
J2
Nmax∑
n
Nmax∑
m
< χn(t)χm(t) > (3.30)
as well as the autocorrelation function W (T ) =< M(t)M(t + T ) > − < M(t) ><
M(t + T ) >
W (T ) =
D2
J2
(< ζ(0, t)ζ(0, t+ T ) > − < ζ(0, t) >< ζ(0, t+ T ) >)
§ The dependence on w of our approximate expectation will lead to a self-consistent definition
for w, and a logarithmic correction the dimensional analysis of the previous section
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=
D2
J2
Nmax∑
n
Nmax∑
m
< χn(t+ T )χm(t) > (3.31)
The angle brackets mean average over the noise η, invoking the expression (3.28) above.
Using (3.25) - (3.28) it is easy to see that for large t
< χn(t)χm(t) >=
8J
π2D
1
(2n+ 1)2 + (2m+ 1)2
(3.32)
and one gets [29]
w =
[
ln(cL/w)
π(J/D)
]1/2
(3.33)
where the logarithmic factor is due to the summation
∑
n,m[(2n+1)
2+ (2m+ 1)2]−1 over
n and m from 1 to Nmax = L/w. As expected from dimensional analysis, the width of the
reaction front goes like
√
D/J . Note also that the midmarket variance grows, slowly, with
L. This is an example of the logarithmic corrections to our crude dimensional analysis of
the scaling laws mentioned in section 2. It is interesting because it implies that having
broad masses of traders behind the best bid and offer will have a (weak) influence on the
behavior of the midmarket, increasing its variance – presumably other scaling laws will be
similarly affected. Thus, choosing the parameter L in our model is not an arbitrary choice,
or technical problem. L defines how tightly traders are bunched together in price space
outside of the reaction front, and is therefore a parameter carrying meaningful dynamical
information about the market, which we may measure along with the other parameters
of the market, J and D.
Finally we note that the width (3.33) does not widen with time, which makes sense
in a stable market, not subjected to external shocks. We shall see in the next section
how these shocks actually may be added to our model, resulting in the usual result for
Brownian motions of a variance growing linearly in time.
We may calculate the correlator (3.31) by the same method as the width. The result
is
W (T ) =
2D
Jπ2
∫
dxdy
x2 + y2
e−x
2J |T | ≈ D
Jπ
(
E1(J |T |)−E1(w2J |T |/L2)
)
(3.34)
where the integration is from ǫ =
√
D/JL2 << 1 to 1 and E1(x) is the exponential
integral E1(x) =
∫∞
x
e−tdt
t
. For small x E1(x) ∼ − ln x and for large x it is exponentially
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small. There are three time intervals: T < 1/J, 1/J < T < 1/Jǫ2 and T > 1/Jǫ2. In
the first interval x2J |T | < 1 for all x and we can expand e−x2J |T | ≈ 1 − x2J |T | which
gives us W (T ) = w2 − (1/2π)DT . In the interval 1/J < T < 1/ǫ2J one can neglect
E1(J |T |) ∼ e(−JT ) and only E1(ǫ2J |T |) is important, so
W (T ) ≈ D
2πJ
ln
[
L2
w2JT
]
, 1 < JT < 1/ǫ2 (3.35)
In the third interval the correlation function is exponentially smallW (T ) ∼ e(−(w2J |T |/L2))
- but T > 1/ǫ2J represents time scales so long as to be beyond the scope of this model.
Note that, because the correlation function is a function of the time difference T a
measurement of W (T ) for a range of values T contains enough information to fix all of
the unknown parameters in the minimal model.
Nonstationary Markets: the Minimal Model with Asymmetric Fluxes
It is also possible to consider the minimal model with different fluxes for the buyers
and the sellers. Cardy et.al. scheme may be used with few modifications. The principal
difference is the non-stochastic part of the solution ζ(x, t) must be time dependent, and
satisfy the appropriate slope conditions at the boundaries. Let J¯ ±∆J be the flux at the
upper (lower) boundary. Then the most general solution for ζ is now
ζ(x, t) = − J¯
D
x− ∆J
2LD
x2 − ∆J
L
t+
∑
n
χn(t) cos
(
(2n+ 1)πx
L
)
(3.36)
The nonstochastic part no longer vanishes at x = 0 – instead its zero is a function of time
x0(t). For small times
x0(t) ∼ −2D∆J
J¯L
t, (3.37)
and this defines the speed of the moving midmarket. Following the same logic as before
we must then evaluate
w2 =
D2
J¯2
(
< ζ2(x0(t), t) > − < ζ(x0(t), t) >2
)
. (3.38)
which leads to the result
w2∆J(t) =
2D
π2J¯
∫
dxdy
x2 + y2
cos(νx) cos(νy) (3.39)
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where ν = (2/π)(∆J/J¯)(J¯t)ǫ Now w∆J explicitly depends on t and because cos(νx) < 1
the width is smaller and decreasing with time. For short times, this may be expanded
out as
w2∆J(t) = w
2 − 2D
π2J¯
ν2 (3.40)
The correlation function may be calculated as well. The result is
W∆J(t, t
′) =
J¯
D
∫
dxdy
x2 + y2
e−x
2J¯ |t−t′| cos(νx) cos(ν ′y) (3.41)
and now it is not only a function of T = t−t′, but also of t and t′ separately due to cos(νx)
and cos(ν ′y) factors. One can again study the behaviour of the correlation function in
detail as before, and we do so in the next section.
4. Beyond the Minimal Model
Markets Under the Influence of Random Disturbances
As we discussed in the introduction, it is possible to consider the minimal model with
the additional feature of random disturbances applied. This will have the effect of injecting
“energy” into the market, causing the system to be partly in the low lying excited states.
Our approach to calculating this sort of effect will be to introduce an external source of
noise into one of the parameters of the model, and average our calculations over that noise
source. Implicit within this procedure is the assumption that these fluctuations occur over
time scales much shorter than those of measurement. We may imagine several kinds of
disturbances.
Random Fluctuations in Trader Drift
The first might be considered a disturbance due to the influence of news. A market’s
internal structure is buffeted throughout the day by news announcements, and the behav-
ior of markets for related assets. To model this effect and observe its effect on the scaling
of market microstructure, we subject our diffusing traders to a random white-noise drift
v(t), proportional in strength to the trade price < v(t)v(t′) >= STdδ(t − t′), where S
is the approximate price at the midmarket, and Td is a parameter which describes the
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strength of the noise. This noise is intended to be the response of traders to a series of
small news items, both good and bad. The effect of this on the stable market represented
by the minimal model is to cause the trade prices to execute a random walk. We then
modify the equation for ζ as
dζ
dt
−D∇2ζ = η + v(t)∂ζ
∂x
(4.1)
We can solve this equation by perturbation in v(t), so that ζ(x, t) = ζ0(x, t)+ζ1(x, t)+ ...,
ζ0(x, t) is a solution to (3.25) and
dζn
dt
−D∇2ζn = η + v(t)∂ζn−1
∂x
(4.2)
Because we are interested in finding ζ(x, t) at small x it is easy to see from
∂ζ0
∂x
= −(J/D)−∑
n=0
(2n+ 1)π
L
χn(t) sin
(
(2n+ 1)πx
L
)
(4.3)
that one can neglect all χn(t) terms, because they are suppressed as x/L, so ζ1(x, t) =
−(J/D) ∫ dtv(t) and ∂xζ1 = 0, which means that the solution in the presence of drift is
ζ(x, t) ≈ −(J/D)x+∑
n=0
χn(t) cos
(
(2n+ 1)πx
L
)
− (J/D)
∫
dtv(t). (4.4)
We see that the effect on the solution ζ is only to add a Brownian motion to the solution,
independent of x. This leads to the following results for the reaction front width w2 =<
M2 > − < M >2 and correlation function W (t − t′) =< M(t)M(t′) > − < M(t) ><
M(t′) > for the MidMarket field M(t) = (D/J)ζ(0, t)
w2(t) =
D
πJ
ln(1/ǫ) + STd(t− t0)
W (t, t′) =W0(t− t′) + STdmin((t− t0), (t′ − t0)) (4.5)
and t0 is the moment when the drift v(t) was switched on. The fluctuations in M(t)
start out as a constant, but then after the characteristic time D
JSTd
, they grow in time, as
expected for a Brownian motion. This is consistent, both with standard option theory,
and with the common observation that intra-day volatilities are larger than expected for
a Brownian motion. Furthermore, we see that the parameter Td should be identified with
the volatility of the trade price.
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Random Fluctuations in the Flux of New Traders
The second type of noise to which we subject the system is a fluctuating rate of
traders entering the market. It is obviously somewhat more general to assume a randomly
fluctuating entry rate than a constant one, and so, at the expense of introducing an
additional parameter, we nudge our model one step closer to a realistic market. Following
Cardy, we may once again compute mean field theoretic approximations to some of the
market microstructure. This calculation may be done directly from the results of the
previous section, for a market with unequal trader influxes, by taking the quantity ∆J
to be randomly fluctuating < ∆J(t) >= 0, < ∆J(t)∆J(t′) >= µ2J¯2F (t − t′), F (0) = 1.
Note that we must have µ << 1 in order to ensure that J is always positive. Using (3.39)
we find
w2∆J(t) =<
2D
π2J¯
∫ dxdy
x2 + y2
cos(νx) cos(νy) > (4.6)
We calculate the average using the relation
< cos(νx) cos(νy) >= 1/2[exp(− < ν2 > (x+ y)2/2) + exp(− < ν2 > (x− y)2/2)] (4.7)
and making use of ν = (2/π)(∆J/J¯)(J¯t)ǫ we have < ν2 >= (2J¯ǫ/π)2µ2t2. Expanding in
< ν2 > we have for small t
w2∆J(t) ≈
2D
π2J¯
∫
dxdy
x2 + y2
[
1− 1
2
< ν2 > (x2 + y2)
]
=
D
πJ¯
[
ln(1/ǫ)− (2ǫµJ¯t)
2
π3
]
(4.8)
and we see by solving (4.8) that the correction to the total fluctuation width due to
random noise in J is negative, and quadratic in time.
Random Fluctuations in Trader Volatility
Finally, we consider noise added to the trader volatility D, and again we may calculate
its effects in mean field theory. To this end, we introduce a small noisy term d(t) to be
added onto the average diffusion constant D¯, D = D¯ + d(t), where < d(t) >= 0 and
< d(t)d(t′) >= TDδ(t− t′), and solve the equation
dζ
dt
−D∇2ζ = η + d(t)∇2ζ (4.9)
perturbatively in d(t): ζ = ζ0 + ζ1 + .... TD must be very small TD << D¯
2, so that the
total trader volatility D is always positive. The equation for ζ1 is
dζ1
dt
− D¯∇2ζ1 = d(t)∇2ζ0
= −d(t)∑
n
χn(t)
(
(2n+ 1)π
L
)2
cos
(
(2n+ 1)πx
L
)
(4.10)
and
ζ1(x, t) =
∑
n=0
χ1n(t) cos
(
(2n+ 1)πx
L
)
(4.11)
where χ1n is easily found to be
χ1n(t) = −
∫ t
0
dt′d(t′)χn(t
′)
(
(2n+ 1)π
L
)2
exp
[
(2n+ 1)2π2D¯
L2
(t′ − t)
]
(4.12)
and χn(t
′) is given by (3.26). It is easy to see that < ζ0(t)ζ1(t) >= 0 because ζ0(t) does
not depend on the noise d(t) and ζ1(t) is linear in d(t) so < ζ0(t)ζ1(t) >∼< d(t) >= 0.
Then < ζ2(t) >=< ζ20(0, t) > + < ζ
2
1 (0, t) > and the midmarket fluctuation width is
given by
w2 =< M2(t) >=
D2
J2
∑
n,m
[
< χn(t)χm(t) > + < χ
1
n(t)χ
1
m(t) >
]
(4.13)
We have already calculated < χn(t)χm(t) > (3.32) and using the same method it is easy
to calculate
< χ1n(t)χ
1
m(t) >= TD
π2
L2D¯
(2n+ 1)2(2m+ 1)2
(2n + 1)2 + (2m+ 1)2
< χn(t)χm(t) >
= TD
8J
L2D¯2
(2n+ 1)2(2m+ 1)2
[(2n+ 1)2 + (2m+ 1)2]2
(4.14)
After summation over n and m we get an extra factor N2max = L
2/w2 and the width
w2 =
D¯
πJ
ln(1/ǫ) +
π
4
TD
J
1
w2
(4.15)
and we see that the correction scales as 1/Jw2 for small TD, and is independent of time.
When TD gets larger the scaling law for w
2 is going to change - it is clear that for
J > D¯2/TD the second term is bigger than the first one and one might conclude that
w ∼ J−1/4. However, TD cannot be too large, because otherwise the total trader volatility
D = D¯ + d(t) can go negative.
In conclusion let us note that the three different fluctuations in the market parameters
lead to three different types of corrections to the width: fluctuations in J , D, and the
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trader drift parameter each lead to corrections to the width. Noise in the drift leads to
a positive correction to w2, growing linearly in t, and independent of J . Noise in J leads
to a negative correction, growing quadratically in time, and noise in D leads to a positive
correction independent of time. The corrections to the autocorrelation function are also
calculable, and are interesting because the function contains more information, which we
may use to extract the parameter of D, J , and L precisely, and to provide additional tests
of these conjectures.
Two-Liquid Model
During a crash, it is clear that a market behaves altogether differently from the quies-
cent markets on which our efforts have so far been concentrated. It is known, for example,
that bid-offer spreads widen out hugely. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect a market
in this state to exhibit some sort of scaling behavior. In this picture, the crashing market
is a different phase, as a gas phase is different from a liquid phase. A model for this phase
would have to have a different ground state, one which allowed for this sort of crashing
dynamics.
The simplest model for a market crash was suggested at the end of the minimal
model discussion, in which a mean field calculation was done for some of the market
microstructure when buyers and sellers entered the market at unequal rates. However,
this does not cause spreads to widen out appreciably, and there is a good reason why.
Best bids and offers can only be calculated from the bids and offers of limit-order traders,
who submit specific prices at which they will trade. During a crash, a large number of
trades are executed as market orders, that is, with no prior warning of the position in
price space that that trader had occupied. We thus introduce a second type of buyer
and seller into the market, the market order trader, who is distinguished from the limit
order trader only in that we cannot see his bids and offers on screen. Thus, the best bid
and offer continue to be calculated from the limit order traders, even though most of the
trading volume is now being conducted by market order sellers, with limit order buyers.
This model can be formulated as one in which there are two flavors of buyer, B and
B′, and two flavors of seller S and S ′. B and S are limit order traders and B′ and S ′ are
market order traders. The prices of the unprimed traders only are used to calculate the
best bid and offer on the trade screen, and are therefore visible to other traders. Thus
the two-fluid model includes the reactions B + S −→ 0, B′ + S −→ 0, B + S ′ −→ 0,
but not B′ + S ′ −→ 0, because these primed traders are invisible to each other. It is
easy to write an evolution operator like (3.18) for all 4 fields Ψb,Ψb′,Ψs and Ψs′ which
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describes the diffusion of all 4 fields and annihilation interactions between them of the
form λ
(
Ψ¯iΨ¯j − 1
)
ΨiΨj for three possible pairs (i, j) = (b, s), (b
′, s) and (b, s′). There is
no pair (b′, s′) - market order traders do not see each other.
For low density and flux of the market order traders, the dynamics of this model is
expected to be dominated by limit order traders, and is essentially the same as the minimal
model. Consider now the case where the density and flux for market order traders equals
that of the limit order traders. In this case there are very few dimension-ful parameters,
so dimensional analysis regains some predictive power. We expect scaling laws exactly
like those of the minimal model, in particular the spread should scale like Spr ∼
√
(D/J).
However, market order traders cause the spread to widen out, because they trade only
with limit order traders, pushing the spread farther out each time they do. This effect
was discussed in [8]. Thus, we expect a numerical prefactor, greater than 1, relating the
minimal model spread to that of the two-liquid model at this symmetric point.
When the density and flux of market order traders dominate that of the limit order
traders, we expect a very wide spread, as a result of the market order traders pushing
limit order bids and offers far away from each other. In this situation the market order
best bid B′ is very near to the limit order best offer O: B′t ∼ Ot, and is far above the
market order best offer, which is near to the limit order best bid: O′t ∼ Bt, in the fashion
of an across market, because they cannot see one another. In this case, the limit order
traders no longer trade with one another, because they are so far away, and we have two
decoupled minimal model systems, the (b′, s) system and the (b, s′) system. The averaged
spread in this case grows linearly with time, with each side moving at the rate determined
by the formula (3.37) from the previous section. In practice, as discussed by [8], this
unstable situation stabilizes itself when market order traders switch themselves to limit
order traders, but that is beyond the scope of this model. Finally, in a crash situation,
we expect an asymmetric flux of buyers and sellers, with most sellers being market order
sellers. Again the (b′, s) and the (b, s′) systems are decoupled into two minimal models,
and the averaged spread again grows linearly with time, as in formula (3.37). In this
situation, which is the situation of interest in this model, market order sellers cannot
switch to limit order sellers and reasonably expect to get their order executed, so this
result is expected to hold.
This model is much harder to treat analytically – method of Cardy and collaborators
[29] may be used, but none of the quantities accessible to us are interesting. We have 4
fields instead of 2 and many more free parameters (different fluxes for limit and market
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order traders, etc.). In the mean field approximation, neglecting the quartic term, one
gets for the densities ρi(x, t) =< Ψi(x, t) >
(∂t −D∂2x)ρB + λρB(ρS + ρS′) = 0; (∂t −D′∂2x)ρB′ + λρB′ρS = 0;
(∂t −D∂2x)ρS + λρS(ρB + ρB′) = 0; (∂t −D′∂2x)ρS′ + λρS′(ρB = 0 (4.16)
and if all diffusion coefficients are the same D = D′ and one finds a particularly simple
equation for the quantity ζ(x, t) = ρB(x, t) + ρB′(x, t)− ρS(x, t)− ρS′(x, t), which may be
interpreted as the density difference of all buyers and sellers.
dζ
dt
−D∇2ζ = 0
This is the same mean field equation as in the minimal model but unfortunately the
non-linear effects cannot be incorporated through a single noise term. Furthermore, the
zero of ζ cannot be interpreted as the midmarket. We are thus confined to numerical
simulations for this model, at least for now. We shall report on computer simulations of
this “Two Fluid Model” in the crashing phase, in an upcoming publication. It will be
interesting to see if in the crashing phase this model leads to log-periodic oscillations [42].
The Bias Model
As mentioned in the introduction, the bias model is a modification of the minimal
model introduced above, in which the diffusion operators DB and DS are modified to
contain a drift, which increases when the last trade has ticked upwards, and decreases
when the last trade has ticked downward. (The amount by which it increases or decreases
is controlled by a parameter which we refer to as the “market tension”.) This means that
our state, our probability distribution at time t, now depends not only on the positions
of traders, but also on the drift.
This model is designed to develop instabilities, and numerical simulations show that,
when the drift parameter ǫ reaches a critical value ǫcrit, the model does indeed crash,
either upwards or downwards. It has the interesting feature that, somewhat like phase
transitions in physical materials, or in traffic patterns, the approach to this transition
is characterized by interludes during which the behavior of the system crosses over to
the new (crashing) behavior, which increase in duration as ǫ approaches ǫcrit. The phase
transition to this new behavior occurs because the drift velocity has grown larger than the
diffusive velocity, and begins to dominate the market’s movements. Dimensional analysis
suggests that ǫcrit ∼ J1/2, which makes sense – crashes are more common in thin markets
than in liquid ones.
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The instability in this model is analogous to a particle rolling off of a sphere, in which
the crash may take an arbitrarily large time to develop. Although any positive bias
eventually leads to a crash, we regard as unstable only those models which lead to a crash
within the prediction horizon of our model, which can be no longer than a few hours, and
certainly cannot extend past the market close.
There are several interesting problems to attack. The first is the new, crashing behavior
itself – we would like to understand how a market’s behavior is altered during such a crash.
The simplest way to do this is to measure the liquidity scaling laws during the crash, and
see how they are changed. Dimensional analysis suggests that they should be modified,
because the drift ǫ itself is a new dimension-ful parameter whose presence now allows a
much wider variety of behavior. In such a phase, market order traders would be expected
to play a large role and thus should be included in any simulation, as in the Two-Fluid
Model (see the previous section).
An even more interesting problem would be how the market’s behavior is modified
in the prelude to a crash. Again, liquidity scaling laws would be the simplest quantity
to measure in such a case, and again dimensional analysis suggests that they should be
modified appreciably in the prelude to a crash, within the framework of our model. It is
plausible that momentum-trading is what becomes important at such moments, and were
such a conjecture born out by empirical tests in the market, its utility would be obvious.
In addition to the liquidity scaling laws, there is the behavior of the drift ǫ itself.
In this simple model, drift feeds on itself. The parameter ǫ sits inside a meta-stable
basin for a while, but is buffeted back and forth by chance movements in the market,
until it is knocked out of its basin, and into the unstable region near ǫcrit. Once here, it
gathers momentum under its own steam. Its trajectory in the unstable region would be
an interesting quantity to calculate.
The bias model describes the onset of crashes, but not their eventual petering out,
because in this model traders remain in the drift-dominated crashing mode until there
are no traders left. An interesting extension of this model would be one in which drift
is somehow dynamically restored to small values, allowing the market to return to the
quiescent state. A model of this kind would enable us to estimate the magnitude and
duration of crashes, because with this new feature they are now only of finite size.
Market Makers
The notion of diffusing traders, who change their trade prices often before trading,
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may be considered also in the context of a market with a single monopolistic market
maker, or even several competing market makers. This problems has been studied in
great detail, from the point of view of inventory[3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 7, 21], strategic traders[10],
and in the presence of information imbalance[9].
We do not intend to review all this work here, we merely suggest that in the types of
markets alluded to in the introduction, dominated by day-trading traders, the modeling
of the order arrival process might be modified. More specifically we propose to refine
the modeling of the order arrival process by using the information contained in the book
of limit orders, together with the diffusion proposal. To this end, we demonstrate this
calculation in a toy model, which omits all the other effects mentioned above, inventory,
trader strategy, and information imbalance.
We imagine a market maker who is allowed to see every limit order available in the
market. As a first approximation, we assume that only limit order traders are present in
the market. The market maker may set his bid and offer anywhere he likes. He desires to
maximize his profit, while minimizing the possibility of any open position. The market
maker will set his constant bid and offer optimally for a time horizon TH . We may define,
during this horizon, the expected number of shares he will sell, as
ΦS =
∫ TH
t0
dt
∫ ∞
LB
dx′G′(LB, x
′; t, t0)ρS(x
′, t0) (4.17)
where G(x, y; t, t′) is the Green’s function for the diffusion operator, which satisfies Dirich-
let G = 0 boundary conditions at x = L. Similarly the expected number of shares he will
buy is
ΦB =
∫ TH
t0
dt
∫ LS
0
dx′G′(LS , x
′; t, t0)ρB(x
′, t0)
In terms of this quantities, his expected profit is
PN = (LS − LB)min(ΦB,ΦS)
and his expected open position is
PO = |ΦB − ΦS|
Thus, we would like to maximize PN while enforcing PO = 0. We may formulate this as a
minimization problem using the technique of Lagrange multipliers, as LS , LB, λ such that
F = PN − λPO
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is minimized However, it is more simply reformulated as LS, LB, λ such that
F˜ = LBΦS − LSΦB − λ(ΦB − ΦS)
is minimized, because the functionals F and F˜ have the same minima. Minimization of
F˜ leads to the equations
ΦS + (LB + λ)
∂
∂LB
ΦS = 0 (4.18)
ΦB + (LS + λ)
∂
∂LS
ΦB = 0 (4.19)
ΦB = ΦS (4.20)
These equations require numerical solution.
5. Towards Experimental Tests of These Conjectures.
At the heart of this paper is a proposal that experiments be carried out, testing
the results obtained above and in future publications, regarding scaling laws in market
microstructure, for the markets in which we are interested. We describe here what is
intended, and will report on work in this direction in a future publication[35].
The experimental tests of the above results may be done by testing against real market
data, over the short time scales necessary to determine the elementary statistical fields
B, O, χ, and their correlations.
Having stated several interesting conjectures in the previous sections, we desire to test
them experimentally. This appears to pose some difficulty – it is not immediate that any
of these experiments can be done.
The reason is that the expectations in the above model are ensemble averages. That is,
they are averages in which the same market is started in the same state many times over,
and allowed to probabilistically evolve. The average is then taken over all the different
possible “worlds” that these different probabilistic paths may take. However, in the real
44
world, there is only one path. We do not have the ability to sample many different worlds.
The only averaging we can do is time-averaging, which in principle is quite a different
thing.
However, we can show by a simple argument that, for certain well-behaved quantities,
they are in fact, the same thing. This occurs because, for these quantities, the system
is “forgetful”, so that the system, after a while, has reset itself, and after the forgetting
time T , is actually the same as another version of the initial world. In other words, after
N forgetting times T , we have actually averaged over N ensemble members.
We show this by considering the ensemble fluctuations of the time average of an
operator, and show that they go to zero, under certain conditions. This means that the
operator is diagonal on any state, i.e. a constant times the identity matrix, and in that
case it’s ensemble average must be equal to the constant. By time translation invariance,
this constant is also equal to the expectation of the (un-time-averaged) operator.
Notice that we require time translation invariance, here. If the state is not at least
approximately in a steady state, then the theorem is just plain false. However, no one
would expect to get a good experimental measurement, either, of any of the elementary
statistical fields, if the state were to sharply change it’s character during the measurement.
Thus a steady state, or a quasi-steady-state, is a necessary precondition for both mea-
surement of a time-averaged quantity and comparison of that quantity to the ensemble
averages we propose to calculate.
The time average of an operator O(t) is (1/T )
∫ t+T
t O(τ)dτ . Notice that it is still
an operator, and therefore contains information about all the different possible worlds
defined by the different paths the world might take. But as T −→ ∞ this operator often
becomes a scalar times the identity matrix. To see this, we compute it’s fluctuations in
some time translation invariant state.
Fluc(O¯) =< (
1
T
∫ t+T
t
dτO(τ)− < 1
T
∫ t+T
t
dτO(τ) >)2 > (5.1)
=<
∫ t+T
t
dτ
∫ t+T
t
dτ ′O(τ)O(τ ′) > − <
∫ t+T
t
dτO(τ) >2 (5.2)
=
∫ t+T
t
dτ
∫ t+T
t
dτ ′Corr(O(τ)O(τ ′)) (5.3)
Thus we see that, if the correlation of O at different times falls off with T , the time
average will also fall off to zero, as T gets large. Hence we arrive at the condition that the
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only quantities we may compare with experiment are those whose time-time correlation
functions decays with time T . Fortunately, this is true of most such quantities – indeed
their correlations usually decay exponentially.
Using this result, we may propose a method of measuring the mooted scaling laws. We
use the bid-offer spread as an example to illustrate the method. We record the bid-offer
spread, and traded volume at every instant of time (with a time spacing small enough to
catch every movement of bid and offer prices). We find an averaging time sufficient to
satisfy the time-averaging relation above, and compute from this recorded data a series
of time averages of spread versus deal rate. We then make a scatter plot of logS versus
log J , and compute a best fit line to this scatter plot – the prediction of the minimal
model is that this slope should be -1/2.
The bid-offer spread in dealer markets, as opposed to the double auction of this paper,
has been studied empirically by [13, 14, 16, 15, 22, 7, 23, 19, 21, 20, 25]. These studies
were motivated by debates on market design. For example, the restrictions on trading
of the registered traders in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), compared against the
affirmative obligations for members of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and of the
more independent dealers of the OTC was studied in [16]. The behavior of the spreads
of the specialists on the NASDAQ vs. the dealers in the OTC was studied by [20], the
spreads on the AMEX were compared with those of the NYSE by [25], and the issue of
competitive dealing on the NYSE was studied by [15, 21]. This field of study was in fact
originated by Demsetz, who studied dealer spreads on the NYSE[13]. Each of these studies
consisted of a linear regression applied to a large number of markets in individual stocks,
and showed (among other things) that spreads have a negative gradient with deal rate,
as we expect in our markets. In the case of [13, 15, 21], this was used to demonstrated
the industry-wide, but not firm-wide, scale economies that exist in the market for dealer
serveices, and made the case against natural monopolies, in favor of competitive dealer
services.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced into the study of market microstructure a series of
models for markets made up of professional traders. These traders scrap for every basis
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point, and trade principally through limit orders, which they change frequently in response
to the changing position of their book, their various perceptions of the direction of the
market, and movements of different but related markets. This type of trader typically
trades on behalf of an institution, such as a bank in, e.g. the interdealer broker markets.
We modeled their changing limit orders as random walks which terminate when they
collide with a price of the opposite kind, a buyer with a seller. This kind of dynamics,
known as diffusion-annihilation dynamics, has been well-studied in the context of physics
and chemistry.
We used this modeling framework to study the scaling of quantities related to market
microstructure. Our expectation is that the purely statistical effects of having large
numbers of traders in a market will be the dominant effect for these quantities, and we do
not entertain the more difficult task of seeking the more subtle effects of trader behavior.
Scaling laws quantify the coarsest features of the markets behavior, and do not require a
detailed model. Hence we focused our efforts on these scaling laws.
Our scaling laws were evaluated as expectations in a measure. This measure was de-
fined as the steady state solution of our dynamics, under the reasoning that a quiescent
market, one not undergoing a large sudden movement, but only trading at an approxi-
mately constant rate, was like a steady state market. Furthermore, it is only in a steady
state market that these scaling laws would be well-defined and meaningful.
We began by studying the scaling laws for various proxies for liquidity, such as the bid-
offer spread Spr, time to midmarket trade τ , trader density near the best bid/offer Ξ(·),
and midmarket variance ξ. We found Spr ∼ J−1/2, τ ∼ J−1, Ξ(·) ∼ J1/2, and ξ ∼ J−1/2.
We then went on to study more complex correlations and conditional expectations as
a function of J , whose qualitative behavior had a ready intuition. These included the
correlation of time changes in best bid with time changes in best offer C∆tB ∆tO, the
density at the best bid/offer conditioned on fluctuation in best bid/offer Ξ(·)(ξ(·)), and the
time change in the bid/offer spread conditioned on the bid/offer spread ∆tSpr(Spr). In
the latter two cases we found the scaling forms Ξ(·)(ξ(·)) ∼
√
J
D
f( D
Jξ2
(·)
), and ∆tSpr(Spr =
s0) ∼
√
D
J
f( D
Js20
).
We also examined response functions to density imbalance, estimated the size a tender
offer must be to attract a certain number of buyers, and the expected profits of a specialist.
Although we have, by dimensional analysis, extracted some information from our model,
a full treatment of these scaling laws requires numerical simulation, the results of which
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shall appear in a forthcoming publication.
Some of our scaling laws were amenable to treatment by an approximation developed
in [29]. We calculated the variance of the midmarket w, and found a logarithmic correction
factor to our dimension-analytic result. The method also enabled us to calculate the time
correlation function.
The above scaling laws and scaling forms were studied first in a model with as few
parameters as possible, to isolate the purely statistical effects. We then introduced to this
model, the “ minimal model”, a series of other features intended to explore its response
under more realistic market conditions, such as the influence of random events. We
considered the influence of randomness in the trader’s drift, as due to the presence of
shocks from news items, or the influence of related markets. Then we considered the
influence of a randomly fluctuating rate of entry of new traders into the market, centered
around some average. Finally, we considered the diffusion constant itself to vary randomly.
We assumed that the fluctuations from the noise were small, so as to generate small
corrections to the minimal model.
In addition, we introduced to the minimal model the influence of “market order
traders”, those who do not register a visible bid or offer in the market before trading.
This led us to a two-fluid model, in which the dynamics is very similar to that of the
minimal model, but the invisible traders cannot react with one another, and the bid-offer
spread is measured only between the visible traders. We proposed this model for the
purpose of investigating scaling laws during a crash, as though this might have its own
sort of steady state behavior. We may cause it to crash by introducing a large flux of
sellers, and we will see that the bid-offer spread widens out in the expected manner, and it
would be interesting to use this model to investigate crossover behavior between crashing
and non-crashing regimes.
We then added in a drift term to the trader’s random walk, whose novel feature is
that it changes with the changes in the trade price. This feature is intended to model
momentum-trading, or herd-like behavior in traders, and requires that we consider slightly
longer time scales, over which these influences may exert themselves. It causes the model
to develop crash-like instabilities, stemming from a transition from diffusion dominated
dynamics to drift dominated dynamics. It is interesting to study the scaling laws in the
prelude to a crash, to observe how they may signal a market’s instability. We propose
a series of calculations of this kind. They must, however be done numerically, and we
postpone these to a future publication [45].
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Finally, we examined the possibility of treating the more traditional dealer problem in
the context of interdealer broker markets, using the proposal of diffusing bids and offers.
We found that it allowed us to use the additional information contained in the limit order
book to make a more refined model for the order arrival process, and we illustrated this
with a toy model in which the dealer’s optimization problem for the bid-offer spread was
defined.
In future publications, we shall do computer simulations to investigate the more de-
tailed predictions of these models, and compare them directly with live market data[35].
There are several other directions in which research might proceed. One possibility is
to observe a market’s reaction in response to a shock. In our minimal model, this would
correspond to the system being suddenly moved out of its ground state, and partially
populating the first few excited states. Because the dynamics of this model are of diffusion
type, these excitations will fade away exponentially, with characteristic decay rates given
by the “energies” of the excited states. By computing these energies, it is possible to
predict the decay rate of market excitations. In a future publication we shall attempt to
calculate these decay rates, and again compare them with market data.
Another possibility for future research is to refine the minimal model. We may add
refinements in several ways. One way might be, following Garman [3], to introduce a
rate λ at which traders at the point x enter and leave the market, proportional to their
population at x. Another way to refine the model would be to introduce interactions
between the buyers and sellers. The most obvious kind are those which allow traders to
react to what they see on the trading screen. We will discuss in a future publication the
“competitive market”. This is a market in which traders are anxious to do deals quickly,
and as such desire to be the best bid or offer. Bidders are therefore attracted to the best
bid, and offers attracted to the best offer, so that they might do the deal first. This would
most likely tighten market spreads, and change the scaling law exponents.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the minimal model bears many similarities to
members of a class of exactly soluble models that have been elucidated by work over
the past two decades[46]. We will explore in a future publication the application of this
method to the minimal model.
7. Appendix
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The form of the time evolution operator
We introduce an operator, Uann, the ”annihilation operator”, which takes any state
which has sellers and buyers at the same point in price space, and returns the same state
with any overlapping buyers and sellers deleted pairwise. If in the state no buyers and
sellers overlap, the annihilation operator does not change the state.
We also introduce diffusion separately for the buyers and sellers DB(t, t
′), DS(t, t
′).
These are the usual diffusion operators. When acting on any initial state, the result is a
solution to the diffusion equation. However, we cannot allow these diffusion operators to
act for very long periods, because at any moment they might cause a seller to jump onto a
buyer, or vice versa. Therefore, our diffusion-annihilation operator must diffuse for a very
short time, then annihilate, then diffuse some more, annihilate again, etc. We alternate
diffusing buyers and sellers, and always insert an annihilation operator in between. Thus,
our evolution operator must take the form
Ev(t, t′) = lim
δt−→0
(t′−t)/δt∏
n=0
UannDS(t + nδt, t+ (n+ 1)δt)UannDB(t+ nδt, t + (n+ 1)δt)(7.1)
Sometimes we will additionally insert into our state a buyer or seller that does not
diffuse, but moves according to a prescribed motion. Then this trader must be regarded
as a different species, with its own separate evolution, which we mix into the evolution
operator. Let the operator defining this prescribed motion be D(·)p (t
′, t), where (·) may be
either S or B. We imagine that the annihilation operator has been appropriately adjusted
to take into account annihilations between buyers and sellers of all species. Then Ev
becomes
Ev(t, t′) = lim
δt−→0
(t′−t)/δt∏
n=0
UannD
S
p (t + nδt, t+ (n+ 1)δt)UannD
B
p (t+ nδt, t + (n+ 1)δt)
UannDS(t + nδt, t+ (n+ 1)δt)UannDB(t+ nδt, t + (n+ 1)δt) (7.2)
Obviously, we may introduce as many species as required, and the above provides a
template for how we must adjust the evolution operators to properly evolve this more
complicated system.
The Form of the Diffusion Operators DB, DS
Diffusion operators occur commonly in statistical field theory, and their form is well
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known, see, for example, [48]. We give the standard result here, for completeness.
DB(t, t
′) = exp (H
(B)
Diff(t− t′)) H(B)Diff =
∑
x
Ψ†B(x+ 1)ΨB(x) + Ψ
†
B(x− 1)ΨB(x) (7.3)
DS(t, t
′) = exp (H
(S)
Diff(t− t′)) H(S)Diff =
∑
x
Ψ†S(x+ 1)ΨS(x) + Ψ
†
S(x− 1)ΨS(x) (7.4)
The Form of the Annihilation Operator Uann
The annihilation operator is an operator that, at every point, eliminates pairs of buyers
and sellers that sit on top of one another. After the action of Uann every point contains
either buyers only or sellers only.
Uann can be written as a product of operators Uann(x) at each point Uann =
∏
x Uann(x),
whose job is to annihilate pairs at the point x. A simple operator that accomplishes this
is
Uann(x) = (Ψ
(B)
x Ψ
(S)
x )
min(N
(B)
x ,N
(S)
x ) (7.5)
however, this is not particularly analytically tractable. We may develop another form by
considering the master equation for chemical reactions at a point x, which occur at rate
λ. Let P (nb, ns) be the probability of having nb buyers and ns sellers at point x. Consider
a price space with only a single point. Then the reaction probability per unit time is
proportional to the number of particles present ∼ λnbnsP (nb, ns), so that
∂P (nb, ns)
∂t
= λ((nb + 1)(ns + 1)P (nb + 1, ns + 1)− nbnsP (nb, ns)) (7.6)
For a price space with many points, and a state described by a probability functional
P (nb, ns) which is a functional of integer sequences nb, ns on the price space P, this is
easily generalized to
∂P (nb, ns)
∂t
= λ
∑
x
((nb(x) + 1)(ns(x) + 1)P (nb + 1, ns + 1)− nb(x)ns(x)P (nb, ns)) (7.7)
This may be expressed in terms of the action of the field operators ΨB(x),ΨS(x), Ψ
†
B(x),Ψ
†
S(x),
as
∂P (nb, ns)
∂t
= HannP (nb, ns) (7.8)
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where Hann is
Hann =
∑
x
Hann(x) Hann(x) = λ(Ψ
†
B(x)Ψ
†
S(x)− 1)ΨB(x)ΨS(x) (7.9)
so that Uann(x) = exp (Hann(x)∆t), where ∆t is the time interval over which this operator
is allowed to act.
In general, an annihilation operator of this form does not completely annihilate the
particles we want annihilated, but the population of such particles decays exponentially,
at the rate λ. Because of this, sellers can sometimes overlap buyers, a feature which is
unrealistic. However, by taking the rate λ∆t to be very large, this effect can be made
arbitrarily small.
The reader should note that this annihilation operator annihilates buyers of a specific
type with sellers of a specific type. When there is more than one type, and consequently
more than one reaction pair,
then we must introduce an annihilation operator for each pair, and the full annihilation
operator is the product of all of them.
Fields with Memory: The Instantaneous Deal Rate Operator, and the Last Trade Field
On a trading screen, one often sees the price at which the most recent trade occured,
regardless of how long ago it may have taken place. We may also infer from a trading screen
the rate at which trades occur, on average, the “deal rate”. We demonstrate how these and
related quantities, that require some memory in the system, may be calculated within this
kind of model. It will prove convenient to compute these in terms of an operator Nζ(x, t),
which, when acting on a pure state at time t increases by 1 at point x if a trade has occurred
at time t and price x, and zero otherwise. The instantaneous deal ra te J(t) is then
J(t) =
∑′
xNζ(x
′, t), and the cumulative deal rate Jcum(t) is Jcum(t) =
∫ t dt′∑′xNζ(x′, t′).
Jcum(t) is a nondecreasing function of t, and as such we may define an inverse mapping
J−1cum(t), which associates to a total deal volume the first time it was achieved.
The last trade field χ(x, t) is constructed as follows. Consider χ˜(t) =
∑′
x x
′(d/dt)Nζ(x
′, t).
If trades occur at one and only one trade price at every time slice t (as they must), then
χ˜(t) is equal to, at time t, x if a trade occured at time t, and 0 otherwise. This is un-
satisfactory for the last trade field, because we want to know the price at which the last
trade occurred, regardless of how long ago it occurred. χ˜(t) may be thought of as the
“non-persistent” last trade field. The “persistent” trade field χ(t), the one we are after,
is then related to the nonpersistent trade field χ˜(t) by χ(t) = χ˜(J−1cum(Jcum(t))).
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The operator Nζ introduced above is the number operator for a new field ζ , with
destruction ζx and creation operator ζ
†
x, Nζ(x) = ζ
†
xζx/δS. In order that Nζ(x) satisfy
what is required of it, we must insert a ζ where a trade occurs. To do this, we modify the
annihilation operator Uann. The pairwise annihilation factors each become
Hann(x) = λ(Ψ
†
B(x)Ψ
†
S(x)− 1)ζ†(x)ΨB(x)ΨS(x) (7.10)
Note that the field ζ differs from the others we have introduced, because it does not
represent a trader. It is a mathematical device that records trading information in the
position of the field ζ .
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